Felix Gaisbauer

Representations of victimization and responsibility during the Second Intifada and the Gaza War in German quality newspapers[1]

Kurzfassung: Der deutschen Presse wurde wiederholt vorgeworfen, durch einseitige Berichterstattung (Bias) über den israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt nicht nur anti-israelische, sondern auch antisemitische Einstellungen bei ihren Lesern zu nähren. Eine inhaltsanalytische Studie von Maurer und Kempf (2011) an einer repräsentativen Stichprobe der Berichterstattung zur Zweiten Intifada und zum Gazakrieg konnte diese Vorwürfe nicht stützen. Die Studie konzentrierte sich aber vor allem auf eskalations- vs. deeskalationsorientierte Darstellungen der Konfliktparteien.
Aufbauend auf das gleiche Textmaterial (N = 396 Zeitungsartikel) hat diese Studie zum Ziel, die Darstellung (Framing) von israelischen und palästinensischen Opfern sowie die Verantwortlichkeitsdarstellung für diese Viktimisierung herauszuarbeiten. Mittels Latent Class-Analyse werden konsistente Muster von Stilmerkmalen identifiziert, die Aspekte von Viktimisierung und Verantwortlichkeit betonen oder unterdrücken. Diese Medienframes werden anschließend hinsichtlich ihrer Parteilichkeit (Bias) und zeitlichen Tendenz (Zweite Intifada vs. Gazakrieg) untersucht.
Es zeigt sich, dass die Medienframes von der Zweiten Intifada zum Gazakrieg zunehmend pro-palästinensisch gebiast sind, während der pro-israelische Bias in der Berichterstattung schwächer wird. Dem wird teilweise dadurch begegnet, dass um Ausgewogenheit bemühte Frames mit pro-israelischer Tendenz israelische Zivilopfer hervorheben. Dabei bedienen sich alle untersuchten Zeitungen der hier identifizierten Biasformen in gleichem Ausmaß, sodass nicht die Presse "an sich" als gebiast zu werten ist, sondern vielmehr einzelne Artikel in allen Zeitungen klar Position beziehen.

Abstract: The German press has often been accused of fanning, through one-sided reportage (bias) on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not only anti-Israeli, but also anti-Semitic attitudes in their readers. A content analytic study by Maurer and Kempf (2011) of a representative sample of the reportage on the second Intifada and the Gaza war does not support these claims. The study concentrated above all on escalation vs. de-escalation-oriented representations of the conflict parties.
Using the same text material (N = 396 newspaper articles), the present study has the aim of determining the representation (framing) of Israeli and Palestinian victims, as well as the representation of responsibility for this victimization in German quality newspapers. By means of Latent Class Analysis, consistent patterns of style characteristics are identified that emphasize or suppress the aspects of victimization and responsibility. These media frames are then studied in regard to their partisanship (bias) and tendency over time (second Intifada vs. Gaza war).
It was found that from the second Intifada to the Gaza war the media frames increasingly show a pro-Palestinian bias, while the pro-Israeli bias in the reportage becomes weaker. In part, this is counterbalanced in that frames that try for balance with a pro-Israeli tendency emphasize Israeli civilian victims. Thereby all the newspapers studied display the here identified forms of bias to the same degree, so that it is not the press "in itself" that can be judged to be biased, but rather the individual articles in all the newspapers take clear positions.

1.   Introduction

Many critics have accused the German press of reporting in a partisan manner about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Anti-Defamation League, 2002). As a result, they assert, the press fans not only anti-Israeli, but also anti-Semitic attitudes among readers (cf. Jäger & Jäger, 2003; Wistrich, 2004).

A forced conflation of anti-Semitism and criticism of Israel should be critically examined not only on logical (Klug, 2003), but also on empirical grounds (Kempf, 2010). But it must be emphasized that a transfer of anti-Semitic resentment to the state of Israel as "the collective Jew among the nations" (Cotler, 2002: 7) is simply disguised anti-Semitism expressed through criticism of Israel (Frindte, Wettig, & Wammetsberger, 2005). Empirical findings from opinion surveys clearly show that – despite the decline in openly anti-Semitic utterances in Germany – many people quite certainly still harbor latent anti-Semitic prejudices, which they express through criticism of Israel (Heyder, Iser, & Schmidt, 2005: 150f.). But – should we hold the media responsible for this disturbing situation?

Studies on this topic by Jäger and Jäger (2003) and Wistrich (2004) are solely qualitative and/or based on specific events that the authors did not randomly select. Due to these deficiencies, they permit no generalizations and are thus strongly limited to an undifferentiated description of the German (print-)media landscape. A quantitative content analysis of escalation vs. de-escalation-oriented reportage on the second Intifada and the Gaza war in newspaper articles from the German quality press which deals with these inadequacies gives a more complex and balanced picture (Maurer & Kempf, 2011). According to this study, the German press reported in a distanced manner on both parties, whereby there was a tendency for the reportage on Israel to become more negative from the second Intifada to the Gaza war, while this trend reversed for the reportage on the Palestinian side. Nevertheless, the media representation of Israel was overall more positive, and the German daily press tried not to take the Palestinian side.

If German media reportage actually fuels anti-Israeli or even anti-Semitic prejudices, it may do so more through a "boomerang" effect than through a systematic anti-Israeli bias in the reportage: Anti-Semitic prejudices could start from the ambivalence between a distance-evoking reportage on the one side, and a pro-Israeli representation on the other side. It could thus provide a breeding ground for not only *manifest,* but also *latent* resentments, ranging from the distorted perceptions of journalists voluntarily censoring their work to blatant conspiracy theories claiming that world Jewry controls the German press (Maurer & Kempf, 2011).

However, an escalation- vs. de-escalation-oriented representation of the Middle East conflict is only one aspect of the reportage: The unequal media treatment of victims belonging to the respective conflict parties could strengthen such a boomerang effect by, e.g., provoking outrage at the disproportionate Israeli employment of force. Building on the same text material as Maurer and Kempf (2011), this study aims to assess the representation of Israeli and Palestinian victims, as well as the attribution of responsibility for this victimization. How do the respective others (and vice versa) report on the victimization of the conflict parties in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict? Are clear patterns of bias thereby recognizable? And if so, how often do these patterns appear during the second Intifada and the Gaza war, and what tendencies in the reportage over time can be inferred from this? Finally, are patterns of bias thereby a matter of a widespread phenomenon, or can we hold specific newspapers responsible for them?

2. Theoretical frames

2.1 Framing and media bias

The media make their contribution to the social construction of reality through the topics they introduce into public discourse (agenda-setting; McCombs & Shaw, 1972) and the way they report on these topics (framing).[1] "To frame" means, according to Entman (1993: 52), "to *select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.*"[2]

As a function of *selection* and *salience,* in the sense of Entman, framing and the concept of *bias* are very close.[3] Thus Stevenson and Greene define bias as "the systematic differential treatment of one candidate, one party, or one side of an issue over an extended period of time. Bias is the failure to treat all voices in the marketplace of ideas equally" (Stevenson & Greene, 1980: 116). Media bias in Middle East reportage is thereby the consistent and systematically different framing of the conflict parties over time.

In the study of media bias, we thereby almost of necessity face a dilemma that Stevenson and Greene describe as follows:

"News coverage which reflects the differences in the candidates or issues can be considered imbalanced and therefore biased. Media which treat candidates or issues differentially can be accused of bias because they are not giving equal coverage to all voices in the marketplace. But if they do treat contenders equally, forcing equivalent coverage in terms of time or space and content, they can be accused of distorting the differences that do exist. And by distorting the news, they are also guilty of bias" (Steveneson & Greene, 1980: 116) .

As a solution to the problem of objectivizing bias, Stevenson and Greene propose a constructivist perspective and conclude on the basis of experimental evidence that the perception and effect of media bias depend less on the fairness or accuracy of journalists, and much more on the recipients themselves (cf. on this also Vallone, Ross, & Lapper, 1985). This viewpoint harmonizes with the framing research according to which media *effects* unfold in the interaction of media *contents* (media frames) with the mental models of their recipients (audience frames; Kempf, 2006; Scheufele, 1999). Thus the (postulated) one-sidedness of the picture of Israel in the media (cf. Jäger & Jäger, 2003; Wistrich, 2004) cannot completely explain the nature of anti-Semitic attitudes. The stocktaking attempted here of the characteristics of Middle East reportage (media frames) is nevertheless of central importance, since it can uncover the construction mechanisms and prevalence of media bias and thereby makes possible conclusions about the effects of these media contents, which must be worked out and supported in further studies.[4]

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1. *Priming* must be named as a third important media model. However, since priming is often understood as an extension of agenda-setting (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007) and is above all of significance for recipient-side media effects, I will refrain from presenting it here.
2. Emphasis in original.
3. Entman even sees bias as an "organizing concept" of the media-effects model of framing, agenda setting and priming.(Entman, 2007: 163).
4. The Peace Research Project Group of the University of Konstanz is working on this question complex in the frame of the DFG Project "Criticism of Israel, Dealing with German History and the Differentiation of Modern anti-Semitism" (Israelkritik, Umgang mit der deutschen Geschichte und Ausdifferenzierung des modernen Antisemitismus). For a general overview of the project, see Kempf. (2011). For the interactions of media frames and mental models, see Thiel (2010), Kempf and Thiel (2012), as well as on the media effects of TV documentaries about the Holocaust: Kopf-Beck, Gaisbauer and Dengler (in print).

2.2   Framing and media bias in the representation of victimization and responsibility

The subject of this study is the representation of the victimization of the parties to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by the respective other conflict party in Germany quality newspapers during the second Intifada and the Gaza war. Starting from the previous considerations, it should be possible to classify the studied newspaper articles in various media frames that differ in how aspects of victimization and responsibility are emphasized or minimized. After identifying them, we will then be able to evaluate these media frames in a further step with regard to their equal or unequal consideration of the two conflict parties and thereby identify their possible bias.

Decisive for the structuring of media frames are, according to Entman (1991), stylistic characteristics that stimulate or weaken *identification* with the persons affected by an action, emphasize or suppress *responsibility* (*agency*) for the reported action, make a conceptual assignment *(classification),* as well as emphasizing or suppressing *generalizations* about the action or the actors to a broader context.

Herman and Chomsky (1988) differentiate how frames can be constituted in reportage on victimization and responsibility, distinguishing between "worthy" and "unworthy victims": Victims of state or interstate violence may suffer in an objectively comparable manner, but if their utility for sustaining enemy images varies, they are treated differently in terms of news value and degree of detail of reportage. While the causes of inequality in media representations of victims lie outside the scope of this study,[1] the framing characteristics through which this bias is manifested appear fruitful for the present work. Thus, Herman and Chomsky propose that

"[W]orthy victims will be featured prominently and dramatically, that they will be humanized, and that their victimization will receive the detail and context in story construction that will generate reader interest and sympathetic emotion. In contrast, unworthy victims will merit only slight detail, minimal humanization, and little context that will excite and enrage [...]. We would also expect great investigatory zeal in the search for enemy villainy and the responsibility of high officials for abuses in enemy states" (Herman & Chomsky, 1988: 35).

Kempf and Reimann (1997) operationalized the stylistic characteristics of this type of framing of victimization and were able to empirically verify and further differentiate the style identified by Herman and Chomsky by studying the representation of Allied victims during the second Gulf war. In the present study, we combine the general framing aspects proposed by Entman (1991) with Kempf's (1997) approach and operationalize it for the respective Israeli and the Palestinian sides. We present these content analytical variables in the following section.

3.   Methods

3.1   Content-analytic variables

We define as victimizing events here the reported concluded or ongoing actions of the conflict parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through which, or as a consequence of which, the respective other conflict party or individuals belonging to it are victimized. *Victimization* is thereby, drawing on Herbert and Dunkel-Schetter (1992), present when media report that a conflict party or one of its members has experienced a negative and psychically or physically painful event and that this event is more or less uncontrollable by the victim. The special case of own victimization was hereby separately coded if members of the conflict parties are described as victims of the actions of their own side (e.g. "friendly fire," on the Israeli side, or Hamas using its civilian population as "human shields," on the Palestinian side).

For subsequent identification of the event constellations reported on in the newspaper articles, we later summarized the so-coded text passages with similar events in higher-level categories. An overview of the frequency of the higher-level categories thus formed and included in the analysis is given by Table 1. For better understandability, as well in the last step we document the subcategories that went into them in Annex 1.

With regard to stylistic characteristics, the reader's *identification* should therefore be influenced by victim representations in which victims and/or targets of victimization are clearly characterized as civilian or military, the uncontrollability of the victimizing event by the victim is emphasized (uncontrollability thereby has the connotation of innocence, cf. Herbert & Dunkel-Schetter, 1992), victim statistics are offered, or the text quotes "witnesses" to the victimization. In this context, a "witness" is every person or authority making a statement that can be recognized as differing from the views of the journalist. Therefore, "witnesses" can be not only members of the conflict parties (e.g., Hamas members or Israeli civilians), but also neutral third parties (e.g., UN institutions). The differentiation according to the source of the statement (*journalist* vs. "witness") and the orientation of the statement go back to the concept of the *opportune witnesses* (Hagen, 1992)*.* According to this, journalists lend more space to communicators who are close to the editorial line (are opportune), but the line of argumentation of these communicators is, however, not further limited. Thus, even witnesses "opportune" for journalists, can allow the reader to identify with the opposite side.

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1.   Here it is a matter of frame-setting (Scheufele, 1999), thus of the process of constructing the media frames I discuss here. See also for Middle East reportage on this Langenbucher and Yasin (2009).

Victimizing event	Frequency	
	Absolute	Relative
Israeli victimization	**264**	**66,70%**
Hostilities	40	10,10%
Palestinian rocket and mortar shelling	126	31,80%
Attack or raid	135	34,09%
Own victimization	17	4,29%
Non-specific/other	42	10,61%
Palestinian victimization	**311**	**78,50%**
Humanitarian situation	65	16,41%
Israeli military operations	69	17,42%
Israeli air strike/artillery shelling	111	28,00%
Isolated military operations	71	17,93%
Occupation	52	13,13%
Own victimization	61	15,40%
Non-specific/other	49	12,37%

Comment: N = 396 newspaper articles. For a further overview see also Annex 1.

Table 1: Higher-level categories and frequencies of the coded victimizing events

Coded as content analytic variables for the *emphasis on or suppression of responsibility* were the provision of statistics on responsibility, the emphasis or respectively justification/relativization of responsibility by journalists and "witnesses." Coded as *categorization of action/actors* was the emotionalization of actions or of perpetrators, as well as the representation of the victimizing event as aggression or reaction. Coded as *generalization of the victimizing actions* (generalization of responsibility) were, finally, text passages in which individual politicians or the population as a whole were held responsible for actions, or an inference was made from the actions of perpetrators to the supposedly essential nature of the conflict party.

The content analytic variables, as well as their frequency of occurrence, are summarized in Table 2. The coding unit was the entire newspaper article. Therefore, with the exception of the victimizing event, which was in each case coded, the content analytic variables were coded if they occurred at least once in an article. For a more detailed presentation of the coding system, see Annex 2.

3.2   Sample

The present study uses text material from Maurer and Kempf (2011). The newspapers analyzed were: *Die Welt* (DW), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ), *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ), *Frankfurter Rundschau* (FR) and *Die Tageszeitung* (taz). This selection consists of papers from the so-called German national quality daily press and – except for the extreme ideological fringes – covers the entire political spectrum. Since not all newspapers publish Sunday and holiday editions, we excluded them.

Defined as the population for the second Intifada were all the newspaper articles of the above newspapers that in the time period from 28 September 2000 to 8 February 2005 contained the key words "Israel" and "Palestin*,"[1] All the articles in this time period that fulfilled these criteria were then subdivided into 18 intervals (quartiles). Defined as the population for the Gaza war were all the newspaper articles for the time period from 27 December 2008 to 19 January 2009 that contained the key words "Hamas" or "Gaza*." We then subdivided the so-identified newspaper articles into 19 intervals (days).

We constructed the random sample according to the principle of the *stratified random sample*. The goal was the selection of 40 articles per newspaper for each of the two conflicts (at least 2 articles per time period and newspaper). With regard to the Gaza war, this was not always possible, so that the final random sample included 78 newspaper articles from DW, 79 from FAZ, 80 from SZ, 80 from FR and 79 from taz. In all, this resulted in a random sample of N = 396 newspaper articles.[2]

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1.   A wildcard "*" is a placeholder with an arbitrary number of places. The search for "Palestin*" thus yields results including "Palestine", "Palestinian", "Palestinians", etc.
2.   For a more detailed description of the population, as well as of the random sample construction, see the article by Maurer and Kempf (2011).

3.3 Development of the coding system, coder training and inter-coder reliability

The coding system was first tested on 20 newspaper articles from the random sample and then further developed in steps until it should enable trained coders to reliably code the variables.

The author coded all 396 texts. To estimate inter-coder reliability, a second coder[1] was trained in the coding system, first using 20 texts that were not included in the reliability estimation, until the inter-rater reliability was satisfactory. Then the second coder coded a random sample of 81 newspaper articles (20.45 percent), which were likewise stratified according to the criteria of newspaper and conflict. The size of the random sample was set so that in the "population" of 396 texts and a type I error of .05 the postulated minimal agreement rate amounts to 90 percent (cf. Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2005: 144ff.).

As a measure of the inter-coder reliability of the content analytic variables, we used the percentage agreements between the coders, as well as Cohen's κ (Cohen, 1960). For the coding, we used the programs MaxQDA (VERBI, 2010) und QDA Miner (Provalis Research, 2011). The calculations were made with the package "irr" (Gamer, Lemon, Fellows, & Singh, 2010) for the statistical software R (R Development Core Team, 2011).

In order to deem the coding of a variable as reliable, Cohen's κ should be at least .70 or higher (a conservative criterion, cf. Lombard, Snyder-Duch, & Bracken, 2002). Alternatively, the percentage agreement (a more liberal standard) should be 90 percent or higher. In three cases the reliability estimates do not fulfill these stringent requirements, but do lie in the acceptable range (cf, Wirtz & Caspar, 2002: 59). The results of the reliability estimates are given in Table 2.-----Table 2

3.4 Data analysis

The analytic strategy involved four cumulative steps. In a first step, the total distributions of the content analytic variables were compared between the two conflict parties. In a second step, the distributions of the content analytic variables for each conflict party during the second Intifada were compared with the distributions during the Gaza war.

In a third step, latent class analyses were calculated for the following groups of variables in order to identify the respective underlying latent reportage styles: (1) events of Israeli and Palestinian victimization, (2) representation of Israeli victimization, (3) representation of Palestinian responsibility, (4) representation of Palestinian victimization and (5) representation of Israeli responsibility. For the rationale to operationalize frames via latent class analyses, see Kempf (1997), Matthes and Kohring (2008), as well as Maurer and Kempf (2011).

Finally, in order to determine how various event constellations combine with the reportage styles for the victimization and responsibility of the two conflict parties to produce more differentiated reportage styles, in a fourth step, we performed a second order latent class analysis with the results of the latent class analyses (first order) from the third step, adding a dichotomous variable representing the two conflicts.

All calculations were made with R (R Development Core Team, 2011) using the package "poLCA" (Linzer & Lewis, 2011) for estimating the latent class models. As a selection criterion for the latent class models that represent the respectively best compromise between precision and parsimony in the data description, we used *Akaike's Information Criterion* (AIC; Akaike, 1987). In addition, we give for the so-identified models the mean classification certainty (mean membership probability with which the newspaper texts belong to the respective latent class), as well as indices of the *proportional reduction of error* (PRE) and – insofar as possible – for the *explanatory power* (EP) of the model, with which the selected model is compared to the saturated model in regard to its explanatory power relative to the *a priori* probabilities of the response patterns (PRE) or respectively in relation to the explanatory power of the pure random model (Kempf, 2012).

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1.   Special thanks to Beate Rohrer for working as the second coder and calculating the inter-coder reliabilities.

Variable group	Frequency		Interkoder-Reliability	
	Absolute	**Relative**	**Agreement**	**Cohen's κ**
Results				
Event of Israeli victimization	265	66.90%	95.06%	0.89
Israeli own victimization	17	4.30%	95.06%	0.58
Event of Palestinian victimization	311	78.50%	93.83%	0.85
Palestinian own victimization	60	15.20%	95.06%	0.81
Israeli victimization				
Naming Israeli civilian victims	166	41.90%	87.65%	0.73
Naming Israeli military victims	73	18.40%	92.59%	0.78
Israeli uncontrollability of victimization	116	29.30%	92.59%	0.82
Humanization/individualization of Israeli victims	65	16.40%	90.12%	0.55
Provision of Israeli victim statistics	102	25.80%	92.59%	0.79
Quoting "witnesses" for Israeli victimization	48	12.10%	91.36%	0.49
Palestinian responsibility				
Emotionalization of Palestinian actions/perpetrators	187	47.20%	93.83%	0.88
Representation as Palestinian aggression	199	50.30%	91.36%	0.83
Representation as Palestinian reaction	15	3.80%	97.53%	0.74
Provision of statistics on Palestinian responsibility	55	13.90%	90.12%	0.63
Emphasis on Palestinian responsibility by journalist	114	28.80%	91.36%	0.72
Justification of Palestinian responsibility by journalist	7	1.80%	96.30%	0.00
Quoting "witnesses" for Palestinian responsibility	179	45.20%	88.89%	0.77
Quoting "witnesses" against Palestinian responsibility	44	11.10%	93.83%	0.73
Generalization of Palestinian responsibility	22	5.60%	97.53%	0.74
Palestinian victimization				
Naming Palestinian civilian victims	216	54.50%	88.89%	0.78
Naming Palestinian military victims	176	44.40%	88.89%	0.77
Palestinian uncontrollability of victimization	96	24.20%	92.59%	0.78
Humanization/individualization of Palestinian victims	80	20.20%	95.06%	0.82
Provision of Palestinian victim statistics	162	40.90%	87.65%	0.72
Quoting "witnesses" for Palestinian victimization	100	25.30%	88.89%	0.69
Israeli responsibility				
Emotionalization of Israeli actions/perpetrators	131	33.10%	81.48%	0.61
Representation as Israeli aggression	174	43.90%	91.36%	0.82
Representation as Israeli reaction	106	26.80%	97.53%	0.93
Provision of statistics on Israeli responsibility	68	17.20%	91.36%	0.62
Emphasis on Israeli responsibility by journalist	69	17.40%	85.19%	0.45
Justification of Israeli responsibility by journalist	73	18.40%	92.59%	0.74
Quoting "witnesses" for Israeli responsibility	194	49.00%	88.89%	0.78
Quoting "witnesses" against Israeli responsibility	164	41.40%	87.65%	0.74
Generalization of Israeli responsibility	6	1.50%	98.77%	0.66

Note: N = 396 newspaper articles

Table 2: Frequencies and inter-coder reliabilities of the content analytic variables

4. Results

4.1. Comparison of the reportage on the two conflict parties

In the comparison of the overall distributions of the analyzed stylistic characteristics (cf. Figure 1, as well as Table 3), it appears that reports about Palestinian victimization are more frequent than ones about Israeli victimization, and thereby victim statistics are likewise more frequently given for Palestinian victims than for Israeli ones. However, only military – but not civilian – Palestinian victims are more often referred to.

With regard to the representation of the responsibility of the two conflict parties for the victimization of the other side, Palestinian actions are more often represented as aggression. A generalization of responsibility from the act or the perpetrators to the essential nature of the conflict party was clearly more frequently made to the disadvantage of Palestinians than to that of Israelis. Statistics emphasizing responsibility were more often given for the Israeli side. As well, "witnesses" not only for, but also against, Israeli responsibility are more often quoted, whereby "witnesses" against Israeli responsibility are clearly in the majority.

These differences suggest that despite the more frequent reportage about Palestinian victimization, Palestinian acts of violence are clearly condemned as aggression. To the contrary, despite the more differentiated representation of Israeli responsibility, more understanding is awakened for the Israeli side.


Figure 1: Overall frequency distribution of stylistic features by conflict party (N = 396)

Variable group	Pearson χ^2	df	p-value
Events			
Event of victimization	77.68	1	< .001
Own victimization	.09	NA[a]	1.0
Victimization			
Naming civilian victims	4.57	1	.325
Naming military victims	7.58	1	.006
Uncontrollability of victimization	1.58	1	.209
Humanization/individualization of victims	.94	1	.332
Provision of victim statistics	18.24	1	< .001
Quoting "witnesses" for victimization	1.89	1	.169
Responsibility			
Emotionalization of actions/perpetrators	.45	1	.502
Representation as aggression	6.47	1	.011
Representation as reaction	1.39	NA[a]	.379
Provision of statistics on responsibility	6.38	1	.012
Emphasis on responsibility by journalist	4.36	1	.368
Justification of responsibility by journalist	.49	NA[a]	.620
Quoting "witnesses" for responsibility	13.67	1	.000
Quoting "witnesses" against responsibility	6.37	1	.012
Generalization of responsibility	8.96	NA[a]	.039

Notes: Total-N = 396.

[a] p-value was simulated because of violated assumptions for exact χ^2-testing using the Monte Carlo procedure with 10,000 replications.

Table 3: Comparisons of the probabilities of appearance of the stylistic characteristics by the conflict parties

4.2 Comparison of the reportage on the two conflicts

The comparison of the distributions of the analyzed stylistic characteristics between the two conflicts (cf. Table 4 as well as Figure 2 and Figure 3) clearly shows that the media victim and perpetrator roles of the conflict parties have shifted.

Representation of victimization

In the reportage on the second Intifada (in comparison to the Gaza war), reports were more frequently made about Israeli victimization, more often not only civilian but also Israeli military victims, victim statistics are more often given, and these victims were also more often humanized in the texts (cf. Figure 2, as well as Table 4).

The representation of the Palestinian side during the Gaza war was to the contrary (in comparison with the second Intifada) marked by more frequent mention of own victimization of Palestinians by Palestinians,[1] less frequent mention of military victims and more frequent quoting of "witnesses" for Palestinian victimization. While the conflict parties do indeed differ in the type of representation of victimization, the emphasis of the victimization between the conflicts and conflict parties appears to have shifted in opposite directions: While in the second Intifada above all Israelis were portrayed in the victim role, this holds for the Palestinians in the Gaza war.

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1. We can regard this as an indicator of a reportage that differentiates on the basis of civilians and combatants: The representation of Palestinian own victimization includes above all mention of Hamas practices such as the use of human shields or the location of military positions in residential areas.

Figure 2: Frequency distribution of stylistic features for victimization by conflict party and conflict

Figure 3: Frequency distribution of stylistic features for responsibility by conflict party and conflict

The representation of Israeli responsibility for Palestinian victimization during the Gaza war (in comparison to the second Intifada) is characterized by two particularities: First, by a more frequent emotionalization and a less frequent representation of Israeli action as a reaction (however, no increase in representation as aggressor), and second, by less frequent citing of "witnesses" against Israeli responsibility (cf. Figure 3 as well as Table 4). This resembles the reportage on the Palestinians during the second Intifada: Palestinian actions were more often represented as aggression and emotionalized, whereby the events were classified as terror in 50 percent of all cases (Gaza war: 18 percent). Statistics on Palestinian responsibility, as well as "witnesses" not only for, but also against Palestinian responsibility, were less often cited, whereby "witnesses" for Palestinian responsibility were clearly more frequently cited. Finally, responsibility during the second Intifada was less often generalized to the Palestinian side. While the Palestinians were thus clearly represented as aggressors during both conflicts, this tendency was weaker during the Gaza war. At the same time, the emphasis on Israeli responsibility increased, so that we can conclude that there was a convergence over time of the reportage on Israel with that on the Palestinian side.

Variable group	Israel			Palestine		
	Pearson χ²	df	p-Wert	Pearson χ²	df	p-value
Events						
Event of victimization	5.69	1	.017	.05	1	.820
Own victimization	.08	1	.771	1.04	1	.002
Victimization						
Naming civilian victims	15.23	1	< .001	1.51	1	.219
Naming military victims	8.23	1	.004	18.23	1	< .001
Uncontrollability of victimization	.95	1	.330	3.08	1	.079
Humanization/individualization of victims	24.31	1	< .001	.02	1	.881
Provision of victim statistics	29.14	1	< .001	.14	1	.710
Quoting "witnesses" for victimization	.48	1	.490	32.14	1	< .001
Responsibility						
Emotionalization of actions/perpetrators	6.75	1	.009	9.81	1	.002
Representation as aggression	1.42	1	.234	13.82	1	< .001
Representation as reaction	19.52	1	< .001	.56	1	.453
Provision of statistics on responsibility	.95	1	.330	5.11	1	.024
Emphasis on responsibility by journalist	.24	1	.624	3.50	1	.061
Justification of responsibility by journalist	.09	1	.769	1.37	NA[a]	.272
Quoting "witnesses" for responsibility	.65	1	.419	8.69	1	.003
Quoting "witnesses" against responsibility	9.58	1	.002	22.34	1	< .001
Generalization of responsibility	2.63	NA[a]	.221	18.83	1	< .001

Notes: Total-N = 396.
[a] p-value was simulated due to violated assumptions for exact χ²-testing using the Monte Carlo procedure with 10,000 replications.

Table 4: Comparisons of the frequencies of appearance of the stylistic characteristics of the different conflict parties and conflicts

4.3   Latent reportage styles of the first order for both conflict parties

To concisely summarize the previous results: the reportage shifted from the second Intifada in comparison to the Gaza war so that a tendency to reverse the representation of the victim and a convergence in perpetrator roles took place. The results of the latent class analyses support these results and allow further differentiations.

4.3.1   Results of the latent class analyses of the first order of the event constellations

The latent class analyses of the first order to identify overarching event constellations showed that a 5-class solution offers the best description of the data (cf. Annex 3.1 as well as Figure 4; mean classification certainty = 0.87; PRE = 85%; EP = 54%).

Figure 4: First order Latent Class Analysis: Constellations of victimizing events

- In Class 1 (14.99 percent) the events of Israeli victimization are characterized by mutual hostilities and Palestinian shelling. Own victimization ("friendly fire") is more often thematized in comparison to the other classes. Palestinian attacks are never mentioned. In this class, to the contrary, Palestinian victimization is characterized by not only general (e.g., army incursions into occupied cities), but also isolated (e.g., targeted killings, raids) Israeli military operations, as well as by own victimization. This event constellation thereby describes a conflict dynamic characterized by *mutual hostilities during ground offensives with simultaneous Palestinian rocket and mortar shelling of Israel*.

- Class 2 (18.02 percent) is a collection of *irrelevant or barely relevant texts* in which all stylistic characteristics rarely appear (< 10 percent). About 33 percent of all texts in this class did not make any references to Israeli victimization (Palestinian side: about 21 percent of all texts).

- Class 3 (14.18 percent) includes newspaper articles in which Palestinian mortar and rocket shelling of Israel stands out as the characteristic type of victimization. All other events appear from rarely to occasionally, but always with below average frequency in comparison with the overall distribution. On the Palestinian side, Israeli air strikes and artillery shelling are most frequently cited, occasionally also own victimization. All other events are mentioned only rarely in comparison to the overall distribution. This constellation thereby characterizes a conflict dynamic of *Palestinian rocket and mortar shelling and Israeli air strikes and artillery attacks*.

- The representation of Israeli victimization by the texts in Class 4 (28.57 percent) is clearly dominated by Palestinian attacks. On the Palestinian side, victimization is characterized by Israeli military operations not only of a general, but also of an isolated nature. Further thematized were the Israeli occupation and individual events summarized under "other." This conflict dynamic seems to illustrate a *spiral of violence consisting of Palestinian attacks and Israeli military operations*.

- Class 5 (24.23 percent) contains newspaper articles in which above all Palestinian rocket and mortar shelling, as well as Israeli own victimization are thematized. On the Palestinian side, reports are made above all about the poor humanitarian situation, own victimization and Israeli air strikes. This conflict representation is thereby characterized by

an *emphasis on the victimization of the civilian population on both sides, as well as own victimization on both sides*. In contrast to all other classes, these articles seem victim-centered, while the other articles seem more actor-centered.

At this point, it can be maintained in summary that the identified classes show the effort of reportage to do justice to the complex interplay of the events of the conflict. We cannot identify a representation of events that points to a systematic distortion to the advantage or disadvantage of one conflict party. The latent class analysis of the second order should show how these conflict dynamics are structured with regard to the thereby victimized.

4.3.2 Results of the latent class analyses of the first order of the representation of victimization

In order to identify the latent reportage styles (frames) in the representation of victimization, latent class models were calculated for each conflict party. For the representation of Israeli victimization, a 3-class solution thereby provides the best description (cf. Annex 3; mean classification certainty = 0.90; PRE = 97%; EP = 93%), while for the representation of Palestinian victimization, six classes should be taken into consideration (cf. Annex 3.2; mean classification certainty = 0.91; PRE = 97%; EP = 95%).

Israeli victimization

Figure 5: First order Latent Class Analysis: Representation of Israeli victimization

The reportage on Israeli victimization can be subdivided into two substantive content classes (1 and 2), as well as *one class of no or only low relevance (Class 3)* which is characterized by very low probabilities of occurrence of the considered stylistic characteristics (< 10 percent), but with 53 percent makes up the greatest share of the overall reportage.

The naming of civilian vs. military victims is to be identified as the central characteristic differentiating between Class 1 and Class 2, which are otherwise very similar (cf. Figure 5): While newspaper articles in Class 1 (11.66 percent) always mention Israeli military victims, they clearly less often cite civilian victims, whereby this tendency is reversed in Class 2 (35.34 percent).

Class 1 is characterized, besides the invariable naming of military and only occasional naming of civilian Israeli victims, by

a frequent representation of the victimizing events as uncontrollable. Although victim statistics are often provided, only rarely are "witnesses" quoted for the victimization. In summary, in *Class 1 military victims are thus emphasized*.

Newspaper articles in Class 2, in which reports on civilian victims are always made, very often thematize (clearly more often than articles in Class 1) the uncontrollability of the victimizing events. Civilian victims are often humanized, quantified in their extent by victim statistics and relatively often commented on by "witnesses." In summary, *in Class 2 civilian victims are thus emphasized*.

What stands out is that the victimization of civilians (Class 2) is emphasized more often than all other stylistic characteristics, but the representation of the victimization of largely military victims (Class 1) uses almost the same reportage style. The emphasis on the uncontrollability of victimization, which appears in both classes, bears a connotation of "innocence" or respectively a suppressed connotation of "involvement" in the case of the military victims.

Palestinian victimization

A 6-class solution offers the best description of the reportage styles of Palestinian victimization (cf. Figure 6). Similar to the reportage styles on Israeli victimization, the emphasis on civilian or military victims offers itself as a prominent characteristic to differentiate the individual classes.

- Class 1 (5.09 percent) is characterized by a strong humanization of civilian victims, who often acquire a connotation of innocence through the emphasis on the uncontrollability of the victimizing events. Victim statistics are seldom drawn on and never "witnesses," whereby the individuality of the victim fates is strengthened. In summary, the *representation of Palestinian victimization in Class 1 occurs through the humanization and individualization of civilian victims*.

- Class 2 (10.09 percent) emphasizes chiefly military victims, whereby victim statistics are always provided, the victimizing events, however, are never represented as uncontrollable, and the victims are only rarely humanized. This emphasis on military victims and statistics while simultaneously representing the victimization as controllable implies that it is a matter of reportage about skirmishes or respectively mutual acts of violence. In the overview, *Class 2 is characterized by an unemotional, objective representation of largely military victims*.

- Class 3 (3.56 percent): This very rare reportage style is marked by the invariable naming of military targets/victims, while only occasionally mentioning civilian casualties. Invariably emphasized is that the victimization of these military victims was uncontrollable. Despite this connotation of "innocence" or "non-participation," the reader is seldom encouraged to identify with the victims, because the victims are never humanized, but for that are relatively often named in statistics or thematized by "witnesses." This combination of the uncontrollable victimization of combatants and military targets makes *Palestinian combatants appear in Class 3 as playthings of the military power Israel*.

- In articles from Class 4 (17.83 percent) not only civilian, but also military victims are always named whose victimization is represented as uncontrollable human suffering. To the contextualization of victimization made in this way, victim statistics are also very often added. However, the authors of these articles never let "witnesses" of victimization speak, for which reason *Class 4 is characterized by a representation of Palestinian victimization that aims at balance*.

- Class 5 (40.02 percent): This by far largest class is consistent, regarding Israeli victimization, with the non-, or respectively hardly, relevant Class 3, since all the stylistic features only rarely (< 10 percent) or occasionally (< 17 percent) appear.

- Class 6 (23.42 percent) is, like Class 4, characterized by an emphasis on civilian victims. However, in Class 6, military victims are only occasionally mentioned. The victims are more often humanized, and statistics are more often provided. Thereby the "witnesses" of victimization usually also have a word. *In summary: Class 6 thus represents a reportage style for Palestinian victimization that strives for balance, in which – unlike Class 4 – civilian victims are emphasized.*

Above all, it can be held that reports on Palestinian victimization are made not only more often, but also in a more differentiated way than those on Israeli victimization. Class 4 and Class 6, which make up in all ca. 40 percent of the total reportage and are characterized by balance, as well as the further 40 percent of texts in Class 5 that do not thematize Palestinian victimization, thereby permit the provisional conclusion that unconditional partisanship for the Palestinian side by the press represents a marginal phenomenon. Nevertheless, very seldom are reportage styles used which thematize above all individual civilian fates (Class 1) or represent Palestinian military victims as at the mercy of Israel's superior power (Class 3). In contrast to them is Class 2, which also surpasses Classes 1 and 3 together in frequency of occurrence, in which above all Palestinian military victims are dealt with in a very distanced way and has no counterpart on the Israeli side. Whether with these very infrequent styles it is a matter of bias in the reportage will be shown by the latent class analyses of the second order, in which the interplay of these styles with the event constellations and representations of responsibility emerge with greater detail.

Figure 6: First order Latent Class Analysis: Representation of Palestinian victimization

4.3.3   Results of the latent class analyses of the first order of the representation of responsibility

To identify the latent reportage styles (frames) in the representation of the responsibility of a conflict party for the victimization of the respective other side, latent class models were estimated for each conflict party. The analysis of the representation of Israeli responsibility yielded a 3-class solution (cf. Annex 3.3; mean classification certainty = 0.89; PRE = 85%; EP = 75%), while for the representation of Palestinian victimization a 4-class solution describes the data best (cf. Annex 3.3; mean classification certainty = 0.85; PRE = 96%; EP = 92%).

Israeli Responsibility

The representations of Israeli responsibility for Palestinian victimization can be described with three classes or reportage styles (cf. Figure 7). One of these styles is *to be judged as not or scarcely relevant, respectively, (Class 2; 30.71 percent) due to the low frequencies of occurrence of* the studied stylistic features (< 10 percent).


Figure 7: First order Latent Class Analysis: Representation of Israeli responsibility

Of the "content" styles, *Class 1 (60.34 percent) is to be regarded as a representation critical of Israel, but not, however, as an anti-Israeli representation of Israeli responsibility*: Israeli action is quite often represented as aggression, but just as often as reaction. Statistics for the emphasis on Israeli responsibility are relatively often provided, and likewise Israeli action is often also emotionalized. Not only the authors of the articles in this class, but also "witnesses" emphasize Israeli responsibility more frequently than they justify or defend it. However, the author often also deals with the opposite side and permits it a voice through "witnesses." Conspicuous hereby is that the question of responsibility is more often thematized by "witnesses" than by journalists themselves. Rarely, but most often in comparison to the other classes, responsibility is generalized to the disadvantage of the Israeli side.

To the contrary, Class 3 (8.91 percent) should be considered a pro-Israeli reportage style: Israeli action is without exception represented as reaction and seldom as aggression. There is rarely any emotionalization of Israeli action, and statistics are never given. While the journalist never emphasizes Israeli responsibility, he or she does, however, frequently quote "witnesses" who do this. Israeli responsibility, to the contrary, is fairly often relativized, not only by journalists, but also by "witnesses." In general, relativizing stylistic features appear more often than ones that emphasize, and responsibility is never attributed solely to the Israeli side. This consistent moderation of Israeli action as merely reactive cannot be judged to be balanced: (1) While "objective" indicators of Israeli responsibility (statistics) are only rarely given, "witnesses" for Israeli responsibility are sometimes given a voice, but in comparison to the "witnesses" for exoneration, they are much less frequently heard. (2) The journalist himself, who never appears accusing, comes to the assistance of these "witnesses" with justifications.

While the major share (ca. 60 percent) of the German reportage on the second Intifada and the Gaza war gives a balanced, detached representation that can be assessed as one that weighs the pros and cons of Israeli actions, that likewise does not shrink from naming escalating actions as such, in about 31 percent of the newspaper articles this is not thematized. A

small share of the reportage (ca. 10 percent) is, to the contrary, to be judged as a pro-Israeli representation of responsibility for Palestinian victimization. It can be maintained that no purely anti-Israeli class can be identified, as, e.g., Wistrich (2004) supposes.

Palestinian responsibility

The representations of Palestinian responsibility for Israeli victimization is best described by four classes or reportage styles (cf. Figure 8), whereby one of the styles can be judged on the basis of a consistently low probability of occurence of the examined stylistic features (< 10 percent) as *not or respectively scarcely relevant (Class 2; 38.63 percent)*.

- Class 1 (18.25 percent) is characterized by an emphasis on and emotionalization of the actions of the Palestinian side as aggression. Relatively often responsibility is generalized solely to the disadvantage of the Palestinian side. Aspects of balanced reportage, such as the occasional representation of Palestinian action as reaction and the quoting of "witnesses" to relativize it, are, however, not thereby counterbalanced, as Palestinian responsibility is always stressed by quoting "witnesses" and often emphasized by journalists. In all, the *texts in Class 1 thereby express a clear assignment of responsibility and generalization by journalists and "witnesses."*

- Class 3 (28.05 percent) resembles Class 1, but differs in that the journalist brings in emotionalization and a representation of own views on Palestinian responsibility and, for that, tends rather to cite "witnesses" for responsibility. The Palestinian side is never represented as reactive. Summing up, the special feature of *Class 3 is the clear assignment of responsibility by "witnesses".*

- Class 4 (15.07 percent) is characterized by an emphasis on and emotionalization of Palestinian action, as well as a clear representation of the Palestinian side as the aggressor. While with Classes 1 and 3 "witnesses" are often quoted (i.e. involved persons or third parties have a say), here the journalist seems to determine the representation. Thereby a *clear assignment of responsibility by journalists in Class 4* is in summary to be emphasized as a characteristic feature.


Figure 8: First order Latent Class Analysis: Representation of Palestinian responsibility

Above all, it is recognizable that Palestinian responsibility for Israeli victimization is clearly maintained: Palestinian action is only rarely represented as a reaction to Israeli action. The consistently high probabilities of occurrence of emotionalizations of these actions as stylistic techniques indicate that Palestinian actors and violent acts are not only explicitly named, but also condemned as such. The greatest difference in the "substantive" Classes 1, 3 and 4 appears to consist much more in who makes these attributions: Not only is the clearest tendency in Class 1 toward the assignment and generalization of responsibility, but also both journalists and "witnesses" emphasize Palestinian responsibility. To the contrary, in Class 3 this emphasis is more often made by "witnesses" than by journalists themselves, while the frequency of occurrence of the features is reversed in Class 4. The frequency with which journalists express views in Class 4 suggests that these articles belong chiefly to the form of the commentary.

4.4 Latent reportage styles of the second order on both conflict parties

Already after the results of the latent class analyses of the first order, a few conclusions can be reached with regard to possible media bias: While there are more frequent reports of Palestinian victimization and Israeli responsibility than the reverse, the Palestinian side is also represented in a more differentiated way. This is shown not only in the clearer naming and rejection of Palestinian acts of violence, but also in the distance from Palestinian military victims that has no counterpart on the Israeli side.

Conspicuous, however, is also that a large share of the newspaper articles seldom or even never thematize victimization and responsibility. According to Entman's definition of framing as salience and selection, this gap in the construction of media bias can also be significant, since due to it victimization or responsibility are not dealt with and can thereby be suppressed. The latent class analysis of the second ordergives information on the question of how the various event constellations and various reportage styles about victimization and responsibility for this combine to form differentiated frames and on how the reportage differs during the two conflict phases. According to the AIC, an 8-class solution (second order) provides the best possible description of the data (cf. Annex 3.4; mean classification certainty = 0.93; PRE = 74%),

The following representation of results is structured as follows: First, we examine how the two conflicts are distributed within the eight latent reportage styles of the second order to determine whether some reportage styles dominate during one of the two conflicts. In a second step, we describe *how* reports are made about the conflict dynamics during both conflicts, that is: how the content analytic patterns of the event constellations of victimization and responsibility of the two conflict parties combine with each other in the latent reportage styles.

Latent reportage styles during the Gaza war and second Intifada

The distribution of the eight identified latent reportage styles of the second order within the two conflicts can be found in Table 5. It is clear that latent Classes/reportage styles 2, 6 and 8 appear only during the second Intifada. Reportage styles 5 and 7 are to the contrary only observed during the Gaza war, while this is mainly the case with Class 4 (80 percent). Besides these conflict-specific reportage styles, Classes 1 and 3 are present with both conflicts and, moreover, in each case almost equally often. With this background knowledge, the content of the latent reportage styles of the second order are presented in the following.

Conflict	Latent reportage style (class) of the second order							
	Class 1	Class 2	Class 3	Class 4	Class 5	Class 6	Class 7	Class 8
Gaza war	0,1725	0,0000	0,1156	0,1801	0,1512	0,0000	0,3806	0,0000
Second Intifada	0,1546	0,2622	0,1122	0,0429	0,0000	0,2859	0,0000	0,1421

Table 5: Conditional distribution of the eight latent reportage styles of the second order in the conflicts

Class 1 (16.50 percent): No/hardly any serious consideration of the perpetrator, victim themes

Reportage style 1 (cf. Figure 9) appears approximately equally often with both conflicts. Only occasionally are there reports of victimizing events on both sides. The latent classes of the first order always dominate, which previously were classified as not or hardly relevant, since they very seldom display the studied stylistic features. The quite low percentage (16.50 percent) of newspaper articles during the second Intifada and the Gaza war making no reference to victimization suggests that the media above all report on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict when it is in phases of escalation (news selection criterion "negativism"). However, it must be mentioned as a reservation that sonly newspaper texts from phases of escalation in the Middle East conflict were sampled. If no thematization of victimization was present in the sample, this was above all because it was a background article on individual persons or progress and setbacks in negotiations.

Figure 9: Distribution of the content analytical first order latent classes within second order latent classes 1 and 3

Class 3 (11.39 percent): pro-Palestinian Frame, which consistently faded out Israeli victimization and Palestinian responsibility

Reportage style 3 appears approximately equally often during the second Intifada and Gaza war. Relatively often thematized are mutual hostilities during ground offensives and Palestinian rocket and mortar shelling. Occasionally – but frequently in comparison to the overall distribution – no or hardly any reports are made about the victimization of the two sides. Likewise, there is occasionally an event constellation characterized by Palestinian rocket attacks, Israeli air strikes, as well as Palestinian own victimization. It is conspicuous that not only Israeli victimization, but also Palestinian responsibility for this are scarcely thematized. The representation of Palestinian victimization often emphasizes civilian victims or tries for balance. In comparison, Palestinian victims are frequently represented as playthings of the military power Israel.

This reportage style is consistent with the criticisms made, e.g., by Wistrich (2004), but constitutes, however, only 11.39 percent of the overall reportage. Further conspicuous is that this pro-Palestinian frame appears in both conflicts, and is also found no more frequently during the Gaza war than during the second Intifada.

Pro-Israeli Frames: Classes 5 and 8

Classes 8 (7.18 percent) and 5 (7.48 percent) are similar not only in their content, but also in their frequency of occurrence and are therefore best represented in terms of their differences (cf. Figure 10).

- Class 8 appears thereby exclusively during the second Intifada and reports above all on the conflict dynamic of Palestinian attacks and Israeli military operations. Usually civilian Israeli victims are emphasized, whereby relatively often there is a clear assignment of responsibility or generalization to the Palestinians by "witnesses" or journalists. Palestinian victimization, to the contrary, is seldom thematized. Along with this, Israeli responsibility for this victimization is likewise not/scarcely thematized. If it is addressed, the representation of the responsibility question is pro-Israeli. Consequently, *Class 8 represents a pro-Israeli frame which either fades out or justifies Palestinian victimization and Israeli responsibility.*

- Class 5, in contrast to Class 8, appears exclusively during the Gaza war and often represents a conflict dynamic that thematizes the suffering of the civilian population of both sides. Relatively often there are also reports on Palestinian rocket attacks and Israeli air strikes. With about equal frequency, Israeli civilian victims are emphasized, but Israeli victimization is not thematized. This class is the only reportage style in which there is usually a clear attribution of responsibility to the Palestinians by journalists and – in contrast to Class 8 – only occasionally by "witnesses." However, there is never silence on the question of Palestinian responsibility. Palestinian victimization is scarcely dealt with, and likewise the question of Israeli responsibility, which when addressed is often pro-Israeli and seldom critical of Israel. *Class 5 thereby constitutes a pro-Israeli frame that largely fades out Palestinian victimization and Israeli responsibility.*

In summary, the pro-Israeli reportage style in Class 8 thereby represents a pendant to Class 5 during the second Intifada. That in Class 8 (second Intifada) Palestinian victimization and Israeli responsibility are faded out or even justified, while these aspects are largely "only" faded out in Class 5 (Gaza war), is an indication of the decline in the pro-Israeli reportage over the course of the conflicts, which can be interpreted as a stronger reserve to the disadvantage of Israel. However, it must be noted that this shift in reportage might be partly attributable to the different character of the two conflicts.

Figure 10: Distribution of the content analytical first order latent classes within second order latent classes 5 and 8

Frames that try for balance: Classes 2 and 4

As well Class 2 (13.24 percent) and Class 4 (11.08 percent) are similar in their content (cf. Figure 11) and with regard to their frequency of occurrence, while they appear respectively only during one of the two conflicts.

• Class 2 appears exclusively during the second Intifada and thematizes the conflict dynamic of the spiral of violence of Palestinian attacks and Israeli military operations, often also mutual hostilities during ground offensives, as well as Palestinian rocket and mortar shelling. With the representation of Israeli victimization, above all military victims are emphasized and Palestinian responsibility is simultaneously emphasized by drawing on "witnesses." The representation of Palestinian victimization aims at a balance between civilian and military victims, but tends to emphasize civilian victims more strongly. The tendency in the representation of Israeli responsibility is pro-Israeli. *Class 2 can thereby be characterized as a frame that strives for balance (with a pro-Israeli tendency) that on the Israeli side emphasizes above all military, and on the Palestinian side, above all civilian victims.*

• The reportage style characterized by Class 4 appears mainly during the Gaza war (about 80 percent of this class) and very often thematizes Palestinian rocket attacks and Israeli air strikes, as well as relatively often also event constellations characterized by mutual hostilities during ground offensives, as well as Palestinian rocket/mortar shelling. Thereby on the Israeli side, above all civilian victims are emphasized. Palestinian responsibility for Israeli victimization tends to be more strongly emphasized than in Class 2, and sometimes also generalized. The representation of Palestinian victimization likewise strives for balance between civilian and military victims, but in contrast to Class 2, it tends to more strongly emphasize military victims. The representation of Israeli responsibility likewise tends to be pro-Israeli, but is also more critical of Israel. *Class 4 thereby represents a frame that tries for balance (with a pro-Israeli tendency), on the Palestinian side emphasizes above all military, and on the Israeli side, above all civilian victims, and thereby deals with the responsibility of both sides more critically than does Class 2.*


Figure 11: Distribution of the content analytical first order latent classes within second order latent classes 2 and 4

The movement in the opposite direction in the victim representations of Classes 2 and 4 is surprising in view of the massive bombardments of the Gaza Strip and the high numbers of Palestinian civilian victims during the Gaza war. Generally, these results suggest that the overall reportage (i.e., on both conflict parties) was more critical during the Gaza war. The consequently also more strongly critical reportage on Israel could, however, – as found by Maurer and Kempf (2011) – thereby be counterbalanced, so that the emphasis in the Gaza war is no longer on Palestinian, but rather on Israeli civilian victims. Consequently, during the Gaza war individual journalists may have attempted to respond with solidarizing reportage to increasing public criticism of Israel and the pressure for justification linked with it.

Tendencies over time: Classes 6 and 7

Class 6 (14.44 percent; cf. Figure 12 is characterized by the fact that the reports are exclusively on the second Intifada and thereby above all on the spiral of violence of Palestinian attacks and Israeli military operations. Thereby as a rule Israeli civilian victims are named. Relatively frequently there is a clear attribution of responsibility and generalization to the Palestinian side not only by journalists, but also by "witnesses," frequently also only by one of the two authorities. The representation of Palestinian victimization either strives for balance or portrays the Palestinians as playthings of Israeli military power, whereby the question of Israeli responsibility is usually discussed in a way critical of Israel and often in a pro-Israeli manner. In summary, it is thus a matter with Class 6 of a pro-Israeli frame that, however, *also thematizes Palestinian victimization*.

Finally, Class 7 (18.84 percent; cf. Figure 12) has a reportage style that appears exclusively during the Gaza war and thereby usually represents a conflict dynamic characterized by the suffering of the civilian population and the own victimization of both sides. Occasionally, mutual hostilities during ground offensives are also thematized, as well as Palestinian rocket and mortar shelling. Very often there is no or scarcely any thematization of Israeli victimization and Palestinian responsibility. When these topics are addressed, however, in comparison often military and, with only less than average frequency, civilian Israeli victims are named, whereby attributions of responsibility are above all made by "witnesses." Class 7 is the only class with the frequent occurrence of a representation striving for a balance of Palestinian victimization, emphasizing civilian victims, whereby in comparison civilian Palestinian victims are often humanized and/or individualized. Military victims are, however, only seldom emphasized. The representation of Israeli responsibility is largely critical of Israel or is sometimes also infrequently thematized – however, the representation is in comparison only rarely pro-Israeli. Thereby, Class 7 can be evaluated as a pro-Palestinian frame that *largely fades out* Israeli victimization and Palestinian responsibility.

Figure 12: Distribution of the content analytical first order latent classes within second order latent classes 6 and 7

Summary and results on the latent reportage styles of the second order

The short descriptions of the various classes of the second order are represented in summary form in Table 6 and – insofar as possible – arranged in terms of content and chronology in accord with the above portrayal. This juxtaposition of the various frames allows an assessment of possible systematic variations and thereby of bias and its tendencies over time. In all, the distribution of the reportage styles from the second Intifada to the Gaza war speaks for (*1*) an increasing pro-Palestinian bias (Classes 6 and 7) alongside of (*2*) a simultaneous weakening of pro-Israeli biased reportage (Classes 8 and 5) that (*3*) in the frames with a pro-Israeli tendency that try for balance (Classes 2 and 4) are thereby counterbalanced, in that Israeli civilian victims are spotlighted in place of Palestinian civilian victims. The consistently pro-Palestinian frame (Class 3; 11.39 percent), as well as the non-thematization (Class 1; 16.50 percent), thereby undergo no change over time, but rather appear about equally often in both conflicts.

Second Intifada	Gaza war
Class 3 (11.39%): pro-Palestinian frame of Israeli victimization and Palestinian responsibility *consistently faded out*	
Class 6 (14.44%): pro-Israeli frame that, *however, also thematizes Palestinian victimization*	Class 7 (18.84%): pro-Palestinian frame that *largely fades out* Israeli victimization and Palestinian responsibility
Class 8 (7.18%): pro-Israeli Frame of Palestinian victimization and Israeli responsibility *faded out or justified*	Class 7 (18.84%): pro-Palestinian frame that *largely fades out Israeli* victimization and Palestinian responsibility
Class 2 (13.24%): Frame that tries for balance (with pro-Israeli tendency) that above all emphasizes on the Israeli side military, and on the Palestinian side above all civilian victimization	Class 4 (11.08%): Frame that tries for balance (with pro-Israeli tendency) that above all emphasizes on the Palestinian side military, and on the Israeli side above all civilian victimization, and thereby, however, deals critically with the responsibility of both sides as Class 2
Class 1 (16.50%): No/hardly any reference to victimization and responsibility	

Table 6: Summary representation of the latent reportage styles of the second order (frames) on victimization and responsibility during the Second Intifada and Gaza war

4.5   Newspaper as covariate

In view of the quite clear positioning of the reportage for one of the conflict parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the question arises of whether the eight identified super-ordinate frames comprehend the overall reportage of the German quality press or are merely attributable to individual newspapers with extreme positions. Beyond this, it is of interest whether the newspapers only take a position on one of the two conflicts and report on it in a biased way.

To answer these questions, we can introduce the newspaper in which an article was published as a covariate and test the bivariate distribution of the frames (latent classes of the second order) with this covariate for statistical independence, in order to determine whether the frequencies of occurrence of the individual frames differ only randomly or whether a systematic bias is present. In order to avoid any unnecessary oversimplification of the data, the following calculations are directly based on the membership probabilities of the latent class results. To test the hypotheses about the positions of the newspapers to one of the two conflicts, those frames that did not appear during the respective conflict were dropped. Since due to in part too low cell filling, the thus created contingency tables violated the preconditions for normal Pearson-χ^2 tests, the p-values were simulated by means of Monte Carlo procedures with 10,000 replications.

Thereby it appears that there is no connection between newspaper and frame ($\chi^2[df = 28; N = 396] = 33.31$, p =.225). The newspapers thus do not differ in a statistically significant way with regard to the frequency with which they published articles interpreted in the sense of the frames. As well, there was no connection between the identified frames and the publishing newspaper, either during the second Intifada ($\chi^2[N = 200] = 17.82$, p =.362) or the Gaza war ($\chi^2[N = 196] = 21.27$, p =.158).

That the here identified frames – and thereby the manifestations of bias – are used uniformly by all the newspapers of the German quality press suggests that they constitute simultaneously present phenomena and not specific partisan publication strategies on the part of individual papers.

5   Summary and Discussion

The goal of the present study was the identification and description of super-ordinate frames in the representations of victimization and the responsibility for it on the sides of the parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this study, we used text material from Maurer and Kempf (2011) on the reportage of the daily German quality press during the second Intifada and the Gaza war.

In regard to the overall distributions of the studied stylistic features it appears – not surprising since the same sample was used – as with Maurer and Kempf (2011), that during both conflicts there were more reports on Palestinian victims. To supplement this, we can add, however, that this applies only for military, but not for civilian Palestinian victims. At the same time, Palestinian actions are more often clearly identified as acts of violence.

A comparison of the overall distributions between the two conflicts permits the conclusion that – while the conflict parties do indeed differ in the manner of representation of victimization – the emphasis on victimization shifted in opposing directions between the conflicts and conflict parties: While in the second Intifada Israel was above all portrayed in the victim role, in the Gaza war this holds for the Palestinians. With regard to the representation of responsibility for the victimization of the respective other side, the Palestinians are clearly represented as the aggressor during both conflicts, whereby this tendency is weaker during the Gaza war. Simultaneously, the emphasis on Israeli responsibility increased. In all, these re-

sults therefore speak for a reversal in the victim roles and a convergence in the perpetrator roles from the second Intifade to the Gaza war.

The results of the latent class analyses (first order) permit a further differentiation of these conclusions: While reports on Israeli victimization express more empathy in general, and military victims are represented similarly to civilian victims, Palestinian victimization is more often thematized in a more differentiated manner, insofar as distinctions are, to be sure, made between civilian and military victims, but this is done in a manner that ranges from the emotional portrayal of individual fates to factual, matter-of-fact thematizations to the representation of Palestinian combatants as playthings of superior Israeli military power. In the framing of responsibility it appears that for the Israeli side the question of responsibility for the victimization of the other conflict party is either critically examined (but not in an anti-Israeli way) or relativized in a pro-Israeli way, while responsibility is always clearly assigned to the Palestinian side and only varies in the degree of vehemence with which, or respectively through which authorities (journalist and/or "witnesses") this occurs.

In the sense of Entman's (1993) definition of framing as a function of salience and selection, in particular those content analytic classes (first order) are of interest that use no, or hardly any stylistic characteristics to emphasize or suppress the salience of victimization or aspects of responsibility. Only in their interaction (second order) does it become clear that in most cases "remaining silent" can be regarded as partisanship. Thematically grouped according to conflict (second Intifada vs. Gaza war) and bias tendency (pro-Israeli vs. pro-Palestinian), the distribution of reportage styles (frames) of the second order from the second Intifada to the Gaza war speaks: (*1*) for an increasingly pro-Palestinian bias (Classes 6 and 7) with (*2*) a simultaneous toning down of the pro-Israeli biased reportage (Classes 8 and 5) that (*3*) is thereby counterbalanced in the frames that strive for balance with pro-Israeli tendencies (Classes 2 and 4) in that, replacing Palestinian civilian victims, Israeli civilian victims are shifted into the foreground. Throughout the conflicts, the continuing pro-Palestinian frame (Class 3; 11.39 percent), as well as the non-thematization of victimization and responsibility (Class 1; 16.50 percent), undergo no change.

The examination of the publishing newspaper as a covariate showed that the distributions of the frames differ only randomly, not only across both conflicts, but also within the two conflicts. In their reportage, all the newspapers employ all frames to the same extent: The here-identified forms of bias are therefore global phenomena of the German (print) media landscape. Therefore, the press is not to be judged as biased "in itself," and it can be maintained instead that individual articles clearly take sides and thereby follow the above formulated classes and trends.

This study confirms the chief results of Maurer and Kempf (2011) on escalation- vs. de-escalation-oriented aspects of reportage: These authors also found a pro-Palestinian shift from the second Intifada to the Gaza war that was, however, moderated by a counterbalancing pro-Israeli trend. In viewing the frequencies of the frames, this "counter-steering" with regard to the representations of victimization and responsibility does not compensate for the shift in victim roles and the convergence in the representation of the responsibility of the conflict parties. Thus, from the second Intifada to the Gaza war, the media balance (if there ever was one) in the examined aspects shifted to Israel's disadvantage.

It is quite possible that these biased media frames, following the definition of Stevenson and Greene (1980), merely reflect the respective particularities of the conflict parties. However, in their complex interaction with their recipients' mental models, these media frames could continue to have an influence through not only a "David versus Goliath," but also a "boomerang" effect. The noticeable unequal media treatment could evoke in recipients outrage at the Israeli employment of force that they feel to be disproportionate and thereby capable of being linked with anti-Semitic resentment.

Furthermore, Maurer and Kempf also found that there were no systematic differences between the studied newspapers in the employment of escalation vs. de-escalation-oriented forms of representation. This is consistent with the present finding that the newspapers also largely agree with regard to their reportage on aspects of victimization and responsibility. Still not considered, however, is the seemingly most salient means of representation for print media: photographic images. Thus, as a function of selection and salience, the meaning content of texts on the same facts can vary considerably, and the visual contrasting or support of a newspaper article with photos should also exert a considerable influence on the effects of media. Thereby the question arises of whether and how texts and images combine to form unified media frames or make competing interpretation and identification offerings to readers.

The first insights from a study of photographic illustrations of the parties to the Middle East conflict taken from a sub-sample of the newspaper articles used here (Hagemann, 2011) suggest that the newspapers differ greatly in their visual representations of the conflict parties. Since not only for Maurer and Kempf, but also in the present study strong correspondences were found in the content of the textual aspects examined, yet the photographic Middle East reportage does not repeat these correspondences, so the meaning content of text frames is probably re-framed for readers by photos.

Future research should therefore take into account not only the textual, but also the visual characteristics of newspaper articles and examine their content congruence or discrepancy in order to add to our understanding of the increase in bias and changes of attitudes due to media representation.

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On the author: Felix Gaisbauer (b. 1985), a university certified psychologist (Diplom-Psychologe), studied psychology and political science at the University of Konstanz, as well as in the frame of a semester abroad devoted to Middle East Studies at Tel Aviv University. He was a member of the Peace Research Group (Projektgruppe Friedensforschung) at the University of Konstanz in the framework of the DFG project "Criticism of Israel: Dealing with German History and the Differentiation of Modern anti-Semitism" under the direction of Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Kempf. He currently works at the German Institute for Development Evaluation (Deutsches Evaluierungsinstitut der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit; DEval).

Address: felix.gaisbauer@uni-konstanz.de

Annex 1: Categories and Frequencies of Victimizing Events (*N* = 396 newspaper articles)

Victimizing event	Frequency	
	Absolute	**Relative**
Israeli victimization	**264**	**66,70%**
Hostilities	**40**	**10,10%**
During battle	26	6,60%
Ambush during battle	14	3,50%
Palestinian rocket and mortar shelling	**126**	**31,80%**
Palestinian rocket and mortar shelling	126	31.80%
Attack or raid	**135**	**34.09%**
Suicide attack	50	12,60%
Bomb attack	23	5,80%
Armed raid	34	8,60%
Attack/raid without more detailed explanations	19	4,80%
Murder of Rehavam Zeevi	9	2,30%
Own victimization	**17**	**4,29%**
Own victimization	17	4,29%
Unspecific/other	**42**	**10,61%**
Non-specific victimization (e.g. merely citing victim statistics without concrete event)	29	7,30%
Violent demonstration	6	1,50%
Gilad Schalit	4	1,00%
Lynch mob	1	0,30%
Attempted kidnapping of soldiers	2	0,50%
Palestinian victimization	**311**	**78,50%**
Humanitarian situation	**65**	**16,41%**
Suffering/consternation of the civilian population at the conflict	34	8,60%
Refusal/Interference with humanitarian aid or exacerbation of the humanitarian situation/ Shelling of UN facilities or personnel	31	7,80%
Israeli military operations	**69**	**17,42%**
Advance/Reinforcement of the offensive	24	6,10%
Military strikes/(counter-) attacks/war	33	8,30%
Attack on/Siege of Arafat's headquarters	8	2,00%
Siege of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem	4	1,00%
Israeli air strike/artillery shelling	**111**	**28,00%**
Israeli air strike/artillery shelling	111	28,00%
Isolated military operations	**71**	**17,93%**
Targeted killing/liquidation	20	5,10%
Destruction of houses/Occupation of houses by army	26	6,60%
Raid/search/attack/arrest	25	6,30%
Occupation	**52**	**13,13%**
Restrictions of mobility (curfew, lockouts, building separation barriers). building settlements/"stealing land"	40	10,10%
Economic consequences of the occupation	12	3,00%
Own victimization	**61**	**15,40%**
Own victimization	61	15,40%
Unspecified/other	**49**	**12,37%**
Unspecified victimization (e.g. merely giving victim statistics without concrete event)	17	4,30%
Shooting Palestinians without more specific commentary	16	4,00%
Palestinians as human shields	1	0,30%
Aggression by Israeli civilians	8	2,00%
Accusation of human rights violations	2	0,50%
Desecration of corpses	1	0,30%
Shelling diplomatic personnel	2	0,50%
Expulsions 1948	2	0,50%

Annex 2: Coding system

On the basis of the definition of Framing as a function of selection and salience (Entman, 1993), the following framing aspects were taken into consideration (Entman, 1991): *Identification* with those affected by an action. (2) conceptual *categorization* of the action. (3) emphasis on or suppression of responsibility for this action, as well as (4) *generalizations of the action or the actors to a greater context*. For the structuring of these framing aspects in the representation of victimization and responsibility, previous works by Herman and Chomsky (1998) were drawn on, as well as operationalizations based on work by Kempf (1997) using stylistic characteristics.

The coding unit was the entire newspaper article. The presence or absence of the stylistic characteristic was coded. First, those text passages were identified that reported on one or more victimizing events. A 'victimizing event' is thereby defined, drawing on Herbert and Dunkel-Schetter (1992), as every reported completed or ongoing action of the conflict parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through which or as a consequence of which the respectively other conflict party or its members are affected by a negative and psychically painful event that is more or less uncontrollable by the victim. Counterfactual and/or hypothetical victimization ("what if" scenarios) were not coded. In connection with the identification of the victimizing events, the representation of these victimizing events and of responsibility for them was coded. For the operationalization by means of content-analytic variables the following style means were drawn on, whereby each style means was respectively examined for the Israeli and Palestinian side.

Representation of victimization: Identification with those affected by the victimizing event

Framing-Aspect	Conflict party	
	Israeli	Palestinian
Naming civilian victims		
Rule:	Code if civilian victims are named or the effects of the event on the civilian or general population become clear.	
Examples:	"According to the Israeli police, for this reason up to a million people in Southern Israel are exposed to the threat of [Kassam rockets]."	"War against the civilian population"; "All rights of way are not at all or only to a limited extent usable by more than two million Palestinians."
Contrary examples:	Soldier; border soldier; police military guard	Hamas leader; Hamas fighter; military targets like rocket launching ramps
Naming military victims		
Rule:	Code if reference to combatant status of the victim (by military rank or similar) or clear identification of fraction membership is given. Also code with military aims ("base," etc.).	
Examples:	Soldier, border soldier; policeman, military base	"Hamas leader"; "A security official of the president was killed."
Contrary examples:	"Jewish settler"; "Israeli [bus-] passenger"	"Palestinian civilian"; "War against the civilian population"
Uncontrollability of victimization		
Rule:	Code if the victimizing event if the victimizing event is represented as at least partly unavoidable for the victim.	
Examples:	"as a booby trap exploded"; "Some of the rockets struck Israel during the three hour truce."	"[was killed] by a shot in the back"; "Palestinian woman dies because her ambulance was turned away several times by Israeli soldiers"
Contrary examples:	"Suicide attack [without further qualification]"	"Hide in a bunker from air strikes"
Humanization/individualization of victims		
Rule:	Code if individuality or humanity of the victim is emphasized by wealth of details. Not coded if context or naming names is made clear.	
Examples:	"A two-year-old child was in grave condition according to hospital reports "	"a 19-year old Palestinian"; Palestinian dies because her ambulance was turned back by Israeli soldiers several times [context]
Contrary examples:	„israelischer Offizier"; „drei Soldaten verletzt"	„Der Getötete gilt als einer der Führer der radikal-islamischen Hamas" [Kontext bezieht sich auf militärische Funktion]
Provision of victim statistics		
Rule:	Code if victim statistics are given. If it is not clear to which conflict party the victims belong, code for both sides.	
Examples:	"32 Israelis … killed"	"30 Hamas fighters"; "The number of Palestinians killed rose to over 770, including at least 200 children."
Contrary examples:	"Hamas terrorists fired more than 700 rockets at Israel [emphasis on Palestinian responsibility using statistics]"	"In the night the Israeli air force flew air strikes against over 60 different targets" [emphasis on Israeli responsibility using statistics]
Quoting "witnesses" for victimization		
Rule:	Code if participants or third parties are referred to or quoted as sources that clearly differ from the author of the text, in order to make clear the extent of victimization. Do not code if names are given merely to verify source. Naming to show existence of a source.	
Examples:	"According to Israeli police, up to a million people in Southern Israel are for this reason exposed to the threat of [Kassam-] rockets."	"'I am shaken by the pictures of dead and wounded', said the Minister"; "An Israeli human rights organization accused in the meantime…"
Contrary examples:	"According to eyewitness reports, fierce fighting erupted"; "according to hospital reports, 18 people were wounded"	"…Israeli soldiers had, according to army reports, killed a Palestinian in the Gaza Strip who allegedly tried to plant a bomb in the vicinity of a Kibbutz [Army merely named as a source reference]"

Representation of responsibility: Categorization of the victimizing events/perpetrators

Framing-Aspect	Conflict party	
	Israeli	Palestinian
Emotionalizationof actions and/or perpetrators		
Rule:	Code if emotionalizing words are used for the actions/perpetrators.	
Examples:	"Israel's retaliatory offensive "; "Massacre"; "Murder"; "Apartheid policy"	"Hamas Terrorists"; "the bloody attack"; "militant Palestinians"
Contrary examples:	"Fierce fighting erupted [no emotionalization]"	
Representation of the victimizing event as aggression		
Rule:	Code if the victimization is represented as escalation, confrontation or provocation.	
Examples:	"Israeli troops pushed [into Gaza] and engaged in fierce fighting there with Hamas."	"The number of rockets fired from the Gaza Strip continues to be nearly constant, with about 30 rounds daily"; "On the latest suicide attack with 18 dead …"
Contrary examples::	"According to army reports, in the night Israeli soldiers killed a Palestinian who was attempting to plant a bomb near a Kibbutz."	„In der Nacht hatten israelische Soldaten nach Armeeangaben einen Palästinenser getötet, der versucht habe, in der Nähe eines Kibbuz eine Bombe zu legen."
Representation of the victimizing event as a reaction		
Rule:	Code if victimization occurs as a reaction to preceding actions of the other side.	
Examples:	"As a reaction to the violent demonstrations and armed attacks of the Palestinians, the Army has hermetically sealed the borders to the Palestinian areas."	"In a retaliatory gesture, militant Palestinians fired rockets at Israel"; "This afternoon Israeli soldiers drove out a group of Palestinians. "Get out!' shout the uniformed soldiers. Then the Palestinians throw stones."
Contrary examples:	"On Thursday night alone, the Army attacked over 50 different targets."	"The number of rockets fired from the Gaza Strip continues to be almost constant with about 30 rounds daily. [Representation as aggression]"

Representation of Victimization: Generalization of responsibility of the deed/the perpetrators to a broader context

Framing-Aspect	Conflict party	
	Israeli	Palestinian
Generalization of responsibility of the actions/perpetrators to a broader context		
Rule:	Code if individual politicians or the entire population are held responsible for the event and/or inferences are made from the deed/the perpetrators to "the character" of the conflict parties.	
Examples:	"A spokesman of the Autonomy Authority referred on Palestinian radio the Israeli strike as a declaration of war on the Palestinian people'"; "The Palestinians held the Israeli government responsible for the bloody incident."	"Wednesday's bloody attack in Northern Israel, in which a suicide bomber took the lives of 17 Israelis" was explicitly mentioned. The Palestinian Autonomy Authority was held directly responsible for the violence"; "An Israeli State Department spokesman had previously held the authorities and Chairman Arafat directly responsible for the attack. Thereby it does not matter that at the time Arafat was in Paris undergoing medical treatment."

Representation of responsibility: Emphasis on/reducing responsibility for the victimizing event

Framing-Aspect	Conflict party	
	Israeli	Palestinian
Provision of statistics on responsibility		
Rule:	Code if statistics are given to indicate responsibility. Do not code with victim statistics (own coding).	
Examples:	"An Israeli Army Spokesperson stated on Sunday that the Israeli air force had attacked 60 targets since midnight…"	"In the past seven years, Palestinian terrorists have fired about 10,500 rockets and mortar grenades at Israel."
Contrary examples:	"32 Israelis … killed [victim statistics]"	"[Attack] in which a suicide bomber caused the deaths of 17 Israelis. [victim statistics]"
Emphasis on responsibility by journalist		
Rule:	Code if the journalist morally condemns the deed/perpetrator or rejects a justification that thematizes taking in stride civilian victims or demonizes the deed/perpetrator.	
Examples:	"The Israeli troops who again on Friday intervened in the Gaza Strip shot a 26 year-old Palestinian dead at the Karni Border Crossing."	"In addition, the Palestinian terrorist groups still mix bolts, nails and screws [in Kassam rockets], in order to increase the effect of the detonation and to kill or wound as many people as possible."
Contrary examples:	See below: Justification/Relativization of responsibility by journalists	
Justification/relativization of responsibility by journalist		
Rule:	Code if the journalist morally justifies the deed/perpetrator, appeals for understanding or expresses the efforts of the conflict parties to avoid civilian victims.	
Examples:	"On Friday and Saturday for the first time since the 1967 Six Day War F-16 bombers attacked police buildings in the West Bank in order to thereby respond to a suicide attack in which on Friday in Netanya an Islamist had killed five Israelis."	"The unsuccessful hunger strike of Palestinian prisoners in the prisons reinforces as much as the lack of effectiveness of non-violent protests among militant Palestinians the feeling that terror alone produces any results in the struggle against the occupation."
Contrary examples:	Siehe oben: Betonung der Verantwortlichkeit durch Journalisten	
Quoting "witnesses" for responsibility		
Rule:	Code if the participants or third parties are named as sources or quoted who clearly differ from the author of the text, in order to clarify the responsibility of the conflict party. Do not code in the case of mere naming to establish the source.	
Examples:	"The United Nations representative in the Gaza Strip, John Ging. Said that it had to be clarified whether this [Israeli] attack was a war crime."	"The Israeli Army explained that the soldiers had fired on the Palestinians because they had attacked an Israeli vehicle."
Contrary examples:	See below: Drawing on "witnesses" against responsibility	
Quoting "witnesses" against responsibility		
Rule:	Code if participants or third parties are drawn on as sources or cited who clearly differ from the author of the text, in order to tone down the responsibility of the conflict party. Do not code if only named to guarantee a source.	
Examples:	"UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon said that Defense Minister Barak had spoken of a "grave error" and assured that nothing like this would happen again."	"[The] Autonomy Authority condemned the suicide attack that endangered the 'dream of an independent state'."
Contrary examples:	See above: Drawing on "witnesses" for responsibility	

Annex 3: Goodness-of-Fit Statistics of the Latent Class Analyses

In the following, the Goodness-of-Fit statistics of the various Latent Class Analyses are documented. All the models were replicated 50 times to avoid local maxima with various random start values. Only the respective maximal logarithm of the likelihood is given here.

3.1 Goodness-of-Fit Statistics of the Latent Class Analyses of the first order of the variables on victimizing events

Model	ln(L)	n(P)	df	AIC
Pure random	-2219,68	1	4094	4441,35
1 Class	-2090,49	12	4083	4204,99
2 Classes	-2012,74	25	4070	4075,49
3 Classes	-1989,99	38	4057	4055,98
4 Classes	-1966,83	51	4044	4035,67
5 Classes	-1944,34	64	4031	4016,67
6 Classes	-1931,63	77	4018	4017,26
7 Classes	-1921,51	90	4005	4023,02
8 Classes	-1909,27	103	3992	4024,54
9 Classes	-1901,50	116	3979	4034,99
Saturated	-1706,70	4095	--	11603,39

3.2 Goodness-of-Fit Statistics of the Latent Class Analyses of the first order of the variables on the representation of victimization

Model	Israeli Victimization				Palestinian Victimization			
	ln(L)	n(P)	df	AIC	ln(L)	n(P)	df	AIC
Pure random	-1309,09	1	62	2620,18	-1537,34	1	62	3076,68
1 Class	-1247,01	6	57	2506,02	-1455,16	6	57	2922,31
2 Classes	-1112,49	13	50	2250,97	-1309,31	13	50	2644,62
3 Classes	-1091,49	20	43	2222,97	-1283,25	20	43	2606,50
4 Classes	-1087,59	27	36	2229,17	-1272,62	27	36	2599,24
5 Classes	-1084,14	34	29	2236,27	-1262,17	34	29	2592,34
6 Classes	-1081,40	41	22	2244,80	-1254,10	41	22	2590,20
7 Classes	-1079,57	48	15	2255,13	-1247,30	48	15	2590,61
8 Classes	-1078,62	55	8	2267,25	-1244,03	55	8	2598,05
9 Classes	-1077,15	62	1	2278,29	-1242,62	62	1	2609,24
Saturated	-1074,42	63	--	2274,84	-1240,30	63	--	2606,60

3.3 Goodness-of-Fit-Statistics of the Latent Class Analyses of the first order of the variables on the representation of responsibility

Model	Palestinian responsibility				Israeli responsibility			
	ln(L)	n(P)	df	AIC	ln(L)	n(P)	df	AIC
Pure random	-1924,73	1	510	3851,46	-1309,09	1	510	2620,18
1 Class	-1540,38	9	502	3098,76	-1247,01	9	502	2512,02
2 Classes	-1303,12	19	492	2644,25	-1112,49	19	492	2262,97
3 Classes	-1283,31	29	482	2624,63	-1091,49	29	482	2240,97
4 Classes	-1269,11	39	472	2616,22	-1087,58	39	472	2253,17
5 Classes	-1260,31	49	462	2618,62	-1084,14	49	462	2266,27
6 Classes	-1249,73	59	452	2617,46	-1081,40	59	452	2280,80
7 Classes	-1243,44	69	442	2624,88	-1079,57	69	442	2297,13
8 Classes	-1238,69	79	432	2635,37	-1078,62	79	432	2315,25
9 Classes	-1234,83	89	422	2647,66	-1077,15	89	422	2332,29
Saturated	-1213,39	511	--	3448,78	-1074,42	511	--	3170,84

3.4 Goodness-of-Fit-Statistics of the Latent Class Analysis of the second order

Model	ln(L)	n(P)	df	AIC
1 Class	-2750,61	17	1782	5535,21
2 Classes	-2528,29	35	1764	5126,58
3 Classes	-2355,02	53	1746	4816,04
4 Classes	-2309,31	71	1728	4760,62
5 Classes	-2274,57	89	1710	4727,14
6 Classes	-2244,19	107	1692	4702,37
7 Classes	-2214,87	125	1674	4679,74
8 Classes	-2193,62	143	1656	4673,25
9 Classes	-2177,95	161	1638	4677,91
Saturated	-2165,64	179	--	4689,27