

*Wilhelm Kempf*

## **Communication barriers in the debate between supporters and critics of Israeli Palestinian policy**

*Kurzfassung:* Gestützt auf Befunde des *Anti-Semitism and the Criticism of Israel* (ASCI) Surveys untersucht der Aufsatz die Schwierigkeiten, die einem konstruktiven Dialog zwischen Unterstützern und Gegnern der israelischen Palästinapolitik entgegenstehen. Während beide Seiten nicht tatenlos zusehen wollen, wenn vor ihren Augen Unrecht geschieht, zeichnen sich die Hardliner unter ihnen durch diametral entgegen gesetzte Grundüberzeugungen aus, so dass die kleinste Abweichung von den je eigenen Glaubenssätzen als Doppelmoral, Delegitimierung und Dämonisierung erlebt wird. Indem Natan Shanranksy diese 3 Ds fälschlich zum Alleinstellungsmerkmal von antisraelischem Anti-Semitismus erklärt hat, haben sich diese Kommunikationsschwierigkeiten noch weiter verschärft und sind bestens geeignet, nicht nur die Fähigkeit von Juden zu torpedieren, sich auf eine Friedenslösung mit den Palästinensern einzulassen, sondern am Ende auch dem Kampf gegen den Anti-Semitismus zu schaden.

*Abstract:* Based on findings of the *Anti-Semitism and the Criticism of Israel* (ASCI) Survey, this paper examines difficulties hindering constructive dialogue between supporters and opponents of Israeli Palestinian policy. While none of the two sides wants to stand idly by watching injustice being committed before their eyes, hardliners on both sides hold diametrically opposed beliefs that make the slightest deviation from their doctrines be experienced as double standards, delegitimation and demonization. Since Natan Shanranksy mistakenly declared these 3 Ds to be unique features of anti-Israeli anti-Semitism, these communication difficulties have increased even more and are not only suited to destroy the ability of Jews to engage with a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, but in the end also to obstruct the struggle against anti-Semitism.

### **1. Introduction**

Since Israel was charged at the 2001 UN Conference in Durban with practicing apartheid, and publicists like the Canadian politician Irving Cotler (2006<sup>1</sup>) created the notion of a "new" anti-Israeli anti-Semitism, a lot of ideological rhetoric has been promulgated that burdens public discourse, makes constructive dialogue between supporters and critics of Israeli Palestinian policy increasingly difficult and impedes work for a just peace in Israel/Palestine.

On the other hand, however, there is no doubt that anti-Semitism *can* (also) be articulated through critique of Israel, and a constructive dialogue with anti-Semites is impossible. Thus, in order to reduce existing communication barriers, critique of ideology alone does not suffice. What we need is an empirically grounded differentiation between serious critique of Israel and anti-Semitism. And we need an accurate picture of the worldview in which not only this critique, but also support for Israeli policy is embedded. Drawing on results of the *Anti-Semitism and the Criticism of Israel* (ASCI) Survey (Kempf 2015, 2017a), the present paper combines these three analytic levels with each other.

The survey was based on a quota sample, representative of the German population with respect to age, gender and school education, including n = 998 study participants from the old and new German states, as well as n = 464 active critics of Israel, who were recruited with an online poll via several organizations actively working for peace in the Middle East. The data collection, planned long in advance, was made between June and November 2010, thus at a time when public opinion was especially critical of Israel due to the recent "Free-Gaza" incident.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Actually, Cotler's article is based on the manuscript of a lecture that he already had given in early March 2002 at the Center for Jewish Studies of York University in Toronto, Ontario.

<sup>2</sup> On the methodological details of the survey see Kempf (2015: 103ff).

## 2. Critique of Israel, anti-Semitism and human rights

Two types of people returned from Auschwitz.  
Those who said: 'Never again',  
and meant by this: 'Never again to the Jews'.  
And those who said 'Never again',  
and meant by this: 'Never again to mankind'.

Avraham Burg (2010)  
1999 – 2003 Speaker of the Knesset

### 2.1 Anti-Israeli and anti-Palestinian resentments

A range of empirical studies seem to show that critique of Israel expresses anti-Semitism. Thus in survey studies (e.g. Zick & Küpper 2010/11), a moderate correlation was repeatedly established between anti-Semitic attitudes and anti-Israeli resentment. As evidence that critique of Israel is anti-Semitic, correlation studies are, however, arguably unsuitable. And in fact, four reasons support this conclusion:

- First, correlations of the levels found explain less than 20% of the variance.
- Second, mere correlation of variables does not prove a causal relationship.
- Third, one can assume that pro-Israeli hardliners who unconditionally support Israel's policies hardly nourish anti-Semitic resentments, while hard-core anti-Semites will again scarcely take positions favoring Israel. Already these two extreme groups, however, create a moderate correlation between anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli resentments, as is found in studies.
- Fourth, interpretation of these correlations as proof of the anti-Semitic character of critique of Israel is based on an inadmissible confusion of critique with resentment.

In addition, anti-Israeli resentments, such as e.g.

- one-sided assignment of guilt to Israel,
- comparisons of Israeli Palestinian policy with National Socialist Jewish policy
- and/or rejection of the right of Jews to remain in the Middle East,

do not constitute a homogeneous attitude. Rather they result from a blending of anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist attitudes, on the one hand, with political attitudes, on the other (Kempf 2015: 48ff, 159ff).

These attitudes are likewise not mere expressions of sympathy or antipathy toward Jews or Palestinians.

- Sympathy for Palestinians certainly does correlate positively with sympathy for the Arab side, but has no negative effect on sympathy for Israelis.
- Quite to the contrary, people who feel antipathy toward Israelis also find Palestinians unsympathetic, and those who find Israelis sympathetic also express sympathy for Palestinians (Bergmann 2008).

This is also reflected in our data (Kempf 2015: 51, 184ff) on the relationship between anti-Israeli and anti-Palestinian attitudes.

Attitude toward Palestinians	Attitude toward Israel		
	Positive	Negative by trend	Negative
Positive	30.2%		18.5%
Negative by trend		27.2%	
Negative		21.0%	

Table 1: Anti-Israeli and anti-Palestinian attitude patterns<sup>3</sup>

If we examine the patterns with which anti-Israeli and anti-Palestinian resentments are linked together or mutually exclude each other, it appears that anti-Palestinian and/or anti-Muslim resentments such as e.g.

- devaluation of Palestinians,
- blanket suspicion of terrorism against Palestinians and Muslims
- and/or demonization of Islam

<sup>3</sup> The answer format of the questionnaire was a five-step Likert scale between the poles of "prejudice" and "justifiable opinion," whose middle response category "partly-partly" was rated as agreement by trend (i.e. as a tendency to hold the respective attitude). The figures in Tab. 1 relate to the total sample (= quota sample plus online sample) and, since of 3.1% of the participants refused to answer the questions, the numbers add up to only 96.9% instead of 100%.

are by no means opposed to anti-Israeli resentment. Accordingly we can conclude that anti-Semitic components of anti-Israeli resentment are less determined by an attitude directed against Jews than by group-related misanthropy (Heitmeyer 2005) also directed against Muslims (cf. Tab. 1) (Kempf 2015: 50f, 184ff).

*Example:* Of all respondents with positive attitudes toward Palestinians<sup>4</sup>, 62% reject anti-Israeli resentments<sup>5</sup>, while of all respondents who share anti-Israeli resentments (at least by trend)<sup>6</sup>, 72% also show (a tendency to) negative attitudes toward Palestinians.<sup>7</sup>

People with a negative attitude toward Palestinians also tend to have certain reservations toward Israelis, and although they suspect Palestinians and Muslims of terrorism and demonize Islam, they simultaneously tend to make one-sided assignments of guilt to Israel and to equate its policies with those of National Socialism.

Critique of Israel can to be sure go together with such resentments – and if it does, we should be cautious. And above all regardless of whether we sympathize with Israel or with the Palestinians or whether as an advocate of human rights we work for reconciliation between the two societies.

Human rights can never be thought of as other than universal rights. But the lessons of Auschwitz are quite ambivalent with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:

- First, with regard to pacifism, where there is a contrast between the lesson drawn by some Germans, Jews and Israelis of “never again war” and the lesson drawn by others that Israel “must survive at any price” (Lapid 2014).
- And second, with regard to the human-rights question itself, where the continuing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians can all too easily lead to one-sided partisanship for the rights of one side, while the rights of the other are ignored.

And besides people who have drawn lessons from history, there are others who have learned nothing at all, even if they no longer display racism and anti-Semitism as bluntly as during the NS period.

All this produces a complex mixture, because of which fear of anti-Israeli anti-Semitism is quite understandable, and the spread of anti-Israeli resentment in German society is thus at least an alarm signal that should not be ignored.

## 2.2 Anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism

On the other hand, the necessity arises precisely from this mixture not to automatically regard all critique of Israel as anti-Semitic, but rather to distinguish between various forms of critique of Israel. To this end, a few terminological clarifications are needed:

- *Anti-Semitism* means hostility toward Jews *as Jews* (Demirel et al. 2011).

This means: the decisive reason for rejecting a person or a group that is the object of animosity is its actual or alleged Jewish origin.

Accordingly, critique of Israel *can* be anti-Semitic, and to be sure precisely when it is directed at Israel because Israel is the state of the Jews.

Already with anti-Zionism, however, its anti-Semitic connotation is by no means unambiguous:

- *Anti-Zionism* consists in a negative attitude toward Zionism, which makes the Jews collectively responsible for Israel’s policies (Bergmann 2002).

Insofar anti-Zionism can certainly represent a gateway from which anti-Semitism develops. The primary reason for the negative attitude is, however, Zionist policy.

Both in anti-Semitism and in anti-Zionism there are various facets that differ in the degree to which they can be rationalized as “legitimate political opinions” but nonetheless can equally serve as indicators for anti-Semitism or respectively anti-Zionism.

In the case of anti-Semitism these are, besides *traditional prejudices* and action patterns like

- dislike of Jews,
- belief in a Jewish world conspiracy and/or
- exclusion of Jews from societal and political life,

---

<sup>4</sup> 30.2% + 18.5% = 48.7% of the sample.

<sup>5</sup> 30.2% of the sample.

<sup>6</sup> 18.5% + 27.2% + 21.0% = 66.7% of the sample.


<sup>7</sup> 27.2% + 21.0% = 48.2% of the sample.

*secondary anti-Semitic* resentments like

- perpetrator-victim reversal or
- demand to close the books on the past

that are manifested in dealing with the Nazi past, the Holocaust and the guilt and responsibility question, and not least of all also *latent anti-Semitism*, which can be understood as a reaction to the communication taboo for anti-Semitic attitudes (Bergmann & Erb 1986) and finds its expression in

- the avoidance of the topic of anti-Semitism and Jews.



SA1 = Demand to close the books on the past  
MA2 = Conspiracy myth  
SA3 = Perpetrator-victim reversal  
LA = Latent anti-Semitism

MA3 = Exclusion of Jews  
MA1 = Dislike of Jews  
AZ1 = Generalizing critique of Israel  
AZ2 = Political anti-Zionism

Figure 1: Anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist attitude patterns

If we classify the study participants on the basis of the patterns to which facets of anti-Semitism combine among themselves and with facets of anti-Zionism, six classes result (cf. Fig. 1) that reveal each of the facets of anti-Semitism as an expression of the same uniform concept of anti-Semitism (Kempf 2015: 35ff, 151ff):

The demand to close the books on the past, the assumption of a Jewish world conspiracy, perpetrator-victim reversal, avoidance of the topic of Jews, exclusion of Jews from social and political life and dislike of Jews do of course differ (in this order) through the increasing difficulty to be regarded as legitimate political opinions. Still, the more someone is inclined to one of these prejudices, the more strongly he will also be inclined to the others.

This holds especially for the demand to close the books, which – by referring to the wish for a positive German identity – can certainly be most easily rationalized and therefore meets with more approval than all other forms of expressing anti-Semitism. However, its anti-Semitic content cannot be denied.

- The more anti-Semitic a person is, the more plausible he finds the demand to close the books on the past,
- and the more someone rejects anti-Semitism, the more he rejects this demand and may find other, different ways to justify a positive identity. For example, by following the example of Germans who come to terms with history and assume responsibility for ensuring that the crimes of National Socialism are never repeated.

In second place follows the conspiracy myth, which possibly may draw its continuing plausibility from the again and again successful demonization of criticizing Israel in public discourse.

Similar to the case of anti-Semitism, according to Bergmann (2002) various facets of anti-Zionism can also be distinguished:

- political anti-Zionism, as, e.g., expressed in the branding of Zionism as a form of racism and
- generalizing critique of Israel which holds “the Jews” per se responsible for Israeli policy.

As well here the two facets again prove to be homologous indicators of anti-Zionism. The more strongly a person inclines to political anti-Zionism, the more strongly he also tends to generalizing critique of Israel (cf. Fig.1).

If, however, one compares the rank order of anti-Semitism with that of anti-Zionism, it appears that there is a large group of people who to be sure display marked anti-Zionism, but in matters of anti-Semitism, however, are largely inconspicuous and (with the exception of the demand to close the books, which they only partly view as a prejudice) clearly reject all expressions of anti-Semitism (cf. Fig. 1).

The conceptual differentiation between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism is thus also empirically confirmed: Anti-Zionism may go together with anti-Semitism, but it doesn't do so in any case, and the same holds – as we will show – for critique of Israel.

### 2.3 Critique of Israel

To make this clear, we have first to clarify how *critique of Israel* is to be understood. In order to avoid branding critique of Israel *a priori* as anti-Semitic or idealizing it *a priori* as based on human rights, we must thereby postulate a wide range of defining attributes and distinctions:

Interpretation frame	Pro-Israeli	Neutral	Pro-Palestinian
War-Frame	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for Israeli policy and critique of Palestinian policy,</li> <li>• Delegitimation of the Palestinians, and</li> <li>• Justification of Israeli use of violence</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for Palestinian policy and critique of Israeli policy,</li> <li>• Delegitimation of Israel, and</li> <li>• Justification of Palestinian use of violence</li> </ul>
Peace-Frame	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Critique of both sides' policies,</li> <li>• Focus on the life needs of Israelis, and</li> <li>• Rejection of both sides' use of violence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Critique of both sides' policies,</li> <li>• Balanced consideration of both societies' life needs, and</li> <li>• Rejection of both sides' use of violence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Critique of both sides' policies,</li> <li>• Focus on the life needs of Palestinians, and</li> <li>• Rejection of both sides' use of violence</li> </ul>

Table 2: Positioning to Israeli-Palestinian conflict

1. Critique of Israel means taking a position to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that is critical of Israeli Palestinian policy. Besides that, there are also other forms of positioning, such as e.g. support for Israeli policy.
2. How a person positions himself to the conflict results from the way he understands the conflict, i.e., from the framework he uses to interpret his knowledge of the conflict.
3. Thereby two fundamental interpretation models – which quasi represent the poles of a scale – can be differentiated (cf. Tab. 2):
  - *War Frames*, which adopt the polarized viewpoint of a conflict party<sup>8</sup>, and
  - *Peace Frames*, which concentrate on reconciliation between the conflicting societies and therefore imply criticism of both sides' policies.

Critique of Israel does not necessarily mean hostility against Israel, but can also result from concern for Israel's future.

"If we leave the situation as it is without offering a solution to the people who live under our occupation," warns Israeli writer Etgar Keret (2013), "this will in the end destroy our country."

And as David Grossmann (2014) has ascertained, there is not only a dividing line in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict "between Jews and Arabs," but across to it there is also a dividing line "between all those who want to live in peace and those who ideologically and emotionally rely on the use of violence."

These dividing lines and frames are also found in the German population, where there are

- pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian hardliners (see below, Fig. 6 and Fig.7), who with respectively 8 to 10% are, however, clearly in the minority.
- Most Germans position themselves in a Peace Frame with a pro-Israeli, neutral or pro-Palestinian orientation.
- With the latter there is also a group of people who are strongly polarized in favor of the Palestinians, but do not cross over the threshold to adopt a War Frame (see below, Fig. 8).

<sup>8</sup> Those who hold this viewpoint are referred to here as 'hardliners'.

- Beyond this, there is also a group of people who avoid taking any position to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which could possibly indicate latent anti-Semitism.
  - With the exception of these people and pro-Israeli hardliners, all these groups are convinced that the aim of Israeli policy is continued oppression and disenfranchisement of Palestinians.
4. In order to understand why a person positions himself one way or another to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
- it does not suffice to examine whether his position goes together with anti-Semitic, anti-Zionist or anti-Israeli resentment, on the one side, or respectively with anti-Palestinian and anti-Muslim resentment, on the other.
  - Beyond this, one must also consider other influencing factors, such as:
    - Knowledge of the conflict, i.e., how well someone is informed about the issues for or against which he positions himself.
    - His emotional closeness to the conflict, i.e., whether he has already been in the country, whether he has Israeli or Palestinian acquaintances, friends or relatives, etc.
    - As well, pacifistic attitudes and sensitivity to the ambivalence of war and peace in Israel/Palestine can have a decisive influence on how people position themselves to the conflict.

	Promises security	Creates insecurity
War-Frame	...because tried-and-true action patterns can be continued.	...because it poses the threat of continued violence.
Peace-Frame	...because it promises an end to violence.	...because new behavioral patterns must be tried whose effectiveness is still uncertain.

Table 3: Ambivalence of the two frames

Not only the continuation of the status quo, but also a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians is linked for both sides with mixed feelings (cf. Tab. 3).

*Perpetuating the status quo* promises security, because one can rely on known behavioral patterns, but it creates insecurity, because it poses the threat of continued violence.

*Policy change* promises security, because it promises an end to violence, but it creates insecurity, because new behavioral patterns must be tried whose effectiveness is still uncertain.

With the majority of Germans we see little of such ambivalence, however: They see – not only for Israel but also for the Palestinians – above all the hopeful side of a peace settlement and the threatening side of the status quo (Kempf 2015: 197ff).

5. If we want to distinguish between anti-Semitic and human-rights-based critique of Israel, we must additionally draw on orientations such as human-rights engagement vs. moral disengagement.

## 2.4 Human-rights orientation and moral disengagement

*Moral disengagement* means those mechanisms with which moral principles can be overridden, if actual behavior conflicts with them. These are according to Bandura (1986, 1999) particularly:


- Justifying action with higher moral aims, palliative comparisons and euphemisms,
- minimizing, ignoring or misinterpreting consequences of action, as well as
- dehumanizing victims and making accusations against them.

*Human-rights engagement* on the other hand means an attitude that not only recognizes human rights “in principle” (or pays lip service to them), but also tries to stand up for them,

- in that it – as well in crisis situations – rejects every limitation of human rights
- and is indignant over human-rights violations and sides with the victims.


In order to speak of human-rights engagement, a person’s human-rights orientation needs to be *consistent* (Kempf 2015: 224ff):

- i.e., the justification of human-rights limitations and indignation at human-rights violations must be *inversely proportional* to each other (cf. Fig. 2): the more strongly a person refuses to justify the limitation of human rights, the more indignation he displays toward human-rights violations.
- Depending on the strength of this attitude, we can distinguish various degrees of human-rights engagement, ranging from absence of (Class K1) to moderate (Class K2) to very strong human-rights engagement (Class K3).



L = Right to life and physical integrity  
S = Peoples' right to self-determination

Figure 2: Human-rights orientation:  
Consistently ordered Classes K1, K2 and K3



M = Protection of minorities  
D = Sanctity of human dignity

Figure 3: Human-rights orientation:  
Inconsistently ordered Classes G1 and G2

Not everyone disposes of such a consistent human-rights orientation, and there are also people for whom the justification of imposing limitations on human rights and indignation over human-rights violations are *proportional* to each other (cf. Fig. 3).

- This is, on the one hand, a group of people who reject the limitation of human rights, but nonetheless are indifferent to the victims of human-rights violations (Class G1).
- On the other hand, it is a group of people who show a knee-jerk reaction to human-rights issues. Depending on what confronts them, they are indignant at human-rights violations, and/or agree that limitation of human rights can be necessary in case of crisis (Class G2).

## 2.5 Varieties of support for vs. critique of Israeli policy

If we examine the patterns in which positioning to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict combines with all these factors, four different varieties of support vs. critique can be identified (Kempf 2015: 79ff, 241ff, 260ff):<sup>9</sup>

- Support for Israeli policy
- latent anti-Semitic avoidance of criticizing Israel
- anti-Semitic critique of Israel and
- human-rights-based critique of Israel.

*Supporters of Israeli policy* can be divided into two sub-groups,

- the first of which consists predominantly of pro-Israeli hardliners,
- while the second group of supporters is smaller and positions itself within a pro-Israeli peace frame.

*Latent anti-Semitic avoidance of criticizing Israel* is characteristic of a group of Germans

- who with a weak pro-Israeli tendency preponderantly abstain from taking a position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
- while – at the same time – they tend not only to demonize Islam and to globally accuse Palestinians and Muslims of terrorism, but also to anti-Semitic, anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli attitudes going as far as making anti-Semitic perpetrator-victim reversals and claiming that the treatment of Palestinians in Israel shows the true face of Jews.
- They only reject those resentments whose prejudicial content is particularly flagrant: Unqualified devaluation of Palestinians and/or dislike of Jews, exclusion of Jews from social and political life and rejection of the right of Jews to remain in the Middle East, as well as – in characteristic fashion – also latent anti-Semitic allegations that one mustn't say what he really thinks about the Jews.

The latter is no argument against the latent anti-Semitic character of this group, but rather a self-serving claim that contradicts the rest of their response behavior. Actually, they do not say what they think, but refuse to answer, and if they do respond, they choose the only apparently neutral answer category, whereby they debunk themselves all the more and characterize prejudices as partly justifiable opinions.

<sup>9</sup> In all, 9 different patterns were identified that in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 are numbered on the basis of their frequency in the overall sample, from 1 (= most common pattern) to 9 (= least common pattern).




Figure 4: Distribution in the population and among NPD voters




Figure 5: Distribution in the population and among active critics of Israel

The conclusion that this pattern is a matter of a latent anti-Semitic attitude is also reinforced in that

- not only is it to be found much *more often* among NPD voters than in the rest of the population,
- but it also represents the *only* attitude found, besides an openly anti-Semitic critique of Israel, on the right margin of society (cf. Fig. 4).

The predominant majority of Germans side more strongly with the Palestinians than with Israel and can be divided into two groups:

*Anti-Semitic critics of Israel* share strong to very strong anti-Semitic, anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli as well as anti-Palestinian and anti-Muslim prejudices, and they are not just typical of NPD voters, but are found across the whole society (cf. Fig. 4).

They can again be divided into two sub-groups,

- of which one consists of pro-Palestinian (respectively anti-Israeli) hardliners<sup>10</sup>,
- while the others take somewhat more moderate<sup>11</sup> positions and – similar to latent anti-Semitic persons who refuse to take a position – oppose resentments whose prejudicial content is particularly flagrant.

*Human-rights-oriented critics of Israel*, to the contrary, reject not only anti-Semitic but also anti-Palestinian and anti-Muslim prejudices. The more radically they take a position in favor of the Palestinians, the more they are prone to anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli resentments, however.

Among them four sub-groups can be distinguished,

- of which two consist of pro-Palestinian hardliners who (a) take a position radically in favor of the Palestinians and (b) reject blanket terrorism accusations against Palestinians and Muslims,
- while (c) these accusations appear partly justifiable to the other two groups who (d) position themselves somewhat more moderately.

While anti-Semitic hardliners are relatively common in the overall German population, hardliners who side with the Palestinians due to human-rights engagement are infrequent (cf. Fig. 5) and were not found at all among voters of the two large people's parties, CDU/CSU and SPD.

<sup>10</sup> "War Frame" in Fig. 4 and Fig.5.

<sup>11</sup> "Polarized" in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5.



### 3. Problematic and consequences of the so-called 3 D Test

What is the guilt of the innocent –  
Where does it begin?  
It begins there  
where he unperturbed, with arms at his side  
stands erect shrugging his shoulders,  
buttons up his coat, lights a cigarette and says:  
There is nothing you can do.  
See, that is where the guilt of the innocent begins.

Gerty Spies (1897 – 1997)  
Imprisoned by the Nazis in the Theresienstadt  
concentration camp in July 1942.

#### 3.1 Anti-Semitic vs. human-rights-based critique of Israel

Without constructive dialogue between supporters and critics of Israeli policy, just peace cannot be achieved in Israel/Palestine. In order to understand why a productive discourse is so difficult, how and why it is hindered by ongoing suspicion of anti-Semitism, what the effects of such suspicion are and how human-rights-based efforts for peace can cope with them, we must take a closer look at the various groups of supporters vs. critics of Israeli policy, or more precisely: we must examine what attributes characterize them.

The predominant majority of human-rights-oriented critics of Israel are relatively moderate (see below). Among active critics of Israel,

- hardliners, in contrast, make up the majority,
- whereby, however, anti-Semitic critique of Israel was scarcely found among them (cf. Fig. 5).

If we compare human-rights-oriented with anti-Semitic critics of Israel (Kempf 2015: 260ff), we find:

- that *human-rights-oriented critics* are generally better informed
- and display greater emotional closeness to the conflict;
- their pacifism is more strongly marked;
- their human-rights orientation is much more consistent;
- they reject human-rights limitations much more decidedly;
- and – unlike anti-Semitic critics – they display no tendency to moral disengagement, but rather engage themselves much more strongly for victims of human-rights violations.
- Their positioning in favor of the Palestinians is *all the more radical*:
  - the *better* they are informed about the conflict,
  - the *greater* their emotional closeness to the conflict,
  - the *more strongly* marked their pacifism,
  - the *more consistent* their human-rights orientation,
  - the *more* they reject limitations of human rights,
  - the *less* they tend to moral disengagement,
  - and the *more* they are indignant over human-rights violations.
- With *anti-Semitic critics of Israel* it is just the opposite. Their positioning in favor of the Palestinians becomes all the more radical:
  - the *less* informed they are,
  - the *less* their emotional closeness to the conflict,
  - the *less* they hold pacifistic attitudes,
  - the *less consistent* their human-rights orientation,
  - and the *less* they are indignant over human-rights violations,

A *sub-group of the most radical* human-rights-oriented critics stands out, however, in that

- although it mostly rejects anti-Semitic resentment,
- it nonetheless considers the secondary anti-Semitic demand to close the books on the past and the perception that Jews have too much power and influence to be not mere prejudices but partly justifiable opinions.

Aside from this, however, this sub-group is also still less prone to prejudices and is clearly better informed about the conflict than, for example, supporters of Israeli policy.

There is, however, no cause for self-righteous idealization of human-rights-based work for a just peace in Israel/Palestine. Anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli resentments, as well as the tendency to adopt the conspiracy myth, found among some human-rights activists, are clear alarm signals of where overweening engagement for human rights can lead.

### 3.2 Support for vs. human-rights-based critique of Israel

As well supporters of Israeli policy take all the more radical positions

- the *better* informed they are about the conflict,
- the *greater* their emotional closeness to the conflict,
- and the *more consistent* their human-rights orientation.

Thus we must grant both groups – supporters and human-rights-oriented critics of Israeli policy – the will not to look on indifferently when injustice occurs before their eyes. Nevertheless, however, it can be doubted how well this actually succeeds in practice (Kempf 2015: 260ff):

- Although both groups do reject (almost all) anti-Semitic, anti-Palestinian and anti-Muslim resentments,
- there is at least a tendency for anti-Israeli resentment which was continually found, and among supporters of Israeli policy as well.
- With the exception of pro-Palestinian hardliners, human-rights-oriented critics are just as prone to make blanket accusations of terrorism against Palestinians and Muslims as are supporters of Israeli policy.
- Political anti-Zionism and generalizing critique of Israel are definitely rejected only by the moderate sub-groups of both, supporters and human-rights-oriented critics,
- and the secondary anti-Semitic demand to close the books on the past is clearly rejected by parts of the human-rights-oriented critics only, while all others – including supporters – regard it as an at least partially justifiable opinion.

What does distinguish the two groups, however, is their strikingly different sensitivity for the ambivalence of war and peace in Israel/Palestine:

- While human-rights-oriented critics see only the encouraging side of a peace settlement and the threatening side of the status quo, or they are quite ambivalent but can find in Palestinian terrorism no barrier to achieving the Palestinians' right of self-determination,
- supporters of Israeli policy are either fixated on the Israeli security dilemma or at least undecided as to whether or not a peace settlement threatens Israel.

This goes together with the fact that pacifism and human-rights engagement serve an opposite function for supporters, whose position becomes the more radical:

- the *less* committed their pacifism,
- the *less* they reject human-rights limitations,
- the *more* they tend to moral disengagement,
- and the *less* they are indignant over human-rights violations.

Their tendency to moral disengagement, generally more strongly marked in supporters, is also mirrored overall in:

- *less* pacifism
- *less* consistent human-rights orientation,
- *less* rejection of human-rights limitations,
- and *less* indignation over human-rights violations.

This inclination to moral disengagement draws attention to the conflict between two values that for good reasons are very important for most Jews, and which supporters of Israeli policy can likewise not avoid: the conflict between the value of Zionism, Israel as the Jewish state, and the values of human rights, equality and democracy.

"This contradiction," explains the Israeli philosopher Omri Boehm (2015), "means a tragedy. For it leads to a way of life that contradicts things that we really believe in," and which can only be upheld if disengaged from one value or the other. This is also mirrored in the typical argumentation patterns of pro-Israeli hardliners (Kempf 2017b,c):

- *Justification through higher moral aims* like the security of Israel as a shelter against global anti-Semitism.
- *Palliative comparisons* that portray Israel as the only democracy in the Middle East.
- *Euphemistic conceptions* that, e.g., use the duty of neutrality as a code for suppressing the visibility of facts that weaken Israeli positions.

- *Denying, ignoring and misinterpreting the consequences* of Israeli occupartheid<sup>12</sup>, e.g., as an perpetrator-victim reversal.
- *Dehumanizing* Palestinians by making the Palestinian people, history and culture invisible.
- *Assignment of guilt*, e.g., to Hamas or the Palestinian Authority, but also to human-rights activists that try to counteract dehumanization and/or to institutions that provide space for their activities.
- *Shifting responsibility*, e.g., for civilian victims of the Gaza War (2014) to Hamas and/or for Israeli occupartheid to global anti-Semitism.

While their attitude to moral disengagement is clearly more negative among human-rights-oriented critics of Israeli policies, at least hardliners among them also find themselves in a value conflict – and to be sure in a conflict between the universality of human rights and one-sided partisanship for the rights of Palestinians.


Accordingly, they are also not really free of moral disengagement, which is, e.g., manifested in one-sided assignment of guilt to Israel. How far mechanisms of moral disengagement prevail in pro-Palestinian hardliners' arguments, if their own or Palestinian actions concretely violate human-rights principles, has not yet been studied. That they do is quite probable, however.

### 3.3 Double standards, delegitimation and demonization

The decisive difference between pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian hardliners lies in which side they take and which view of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict they adopt.


Competitive conflicts go together with misperceptions *on both sides* (Deutsch 1973, 2000). These misperceptions are the very the motor of conflict escalation. With growing *hostility* between conflict parties they finally assume the form of *double standards* and in long-term conflicts harden into societal beliefs (Bar-Tal 1998) that are among other things marked by belief in maintaining personal and national security through a policy of strength. What one side believes is strictly rejected by the other and experienced as *delegitimation* and *demonization*.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in this regard no exception but rather precisely the classical example. This is also reflected in the typical positioning patterns of both, pro-Palestinian (cf. Fig.6) and pro-Israeli hardliners (cf. Fig. 7) (Kempf 2015: 203ff), so that with these radical critics or respectively supporters of Israeli policy we can quite well speak of hostility: Hostility to Israel, on the one side, and hostility to Palestinians, on the other.



E = Advocacy of coercive measures against the opponent  
F = Criticism of opponent's intransigence  
G = Delegitimation of opponent's policy

Figure 6: Pro-Palestinian War-Frame



H = Justification of own military measures  
I = Condemnation of opponent's side's use of violence

Figure 7: Pro-Israeli War-Frame

Through deeply rooted fear of anti-Semitism, this situation is further intensified and caused the head of The Jewish Agency, Natan Sharansky (2004), to propose the 3 Ds – demonization, double standards and delegitimation – as a litmus test for anti-Israeli anti-Semitism.

As understandable as the wish is to have a simple criterion to identify anti-Israeli anti-Semitism, his 3 Ds are unsuitable for this purpose, however.

<sup>12</sup> Combining occupation and apartheid, and according to Bar-Tal (2015) defined as discrimination between populations on the basis of ethnic origin as a result of a lasting occupation that denies political and economic rights from the occupied population..

- First, although the 3 Ds can serve as an indicator for hostility toward Israel (or respectively toward Israeli policy), they do not offer any conclusive evidence that the reason for this hostility is Israel as the Jewish state.
- Second, Sharansky's substantiations are for their part not free of double standards, and even the extreme examples of demonization and delegitimation that he offers are no absolute proof of anti-Semitism.
- And third, the 3 Ds can also be found in the line of argumentation of (radical) supporters of Israeli policy (Kempf 2017b, c).

As an example of demonization, Sharansky offers the equation of Israeli Palestinian policy with National Socialist Jewish policy. That such NS comparisons are completely inappropriate is obvious, and – despite all critique of Israeli policy – there is scarcely anything more absurd than to compare it with the destruction of European Jewry – and this is what people generally associate with NS Jewish policy.

- There is no question that NS comparisons *can* follow an anti-Semitic motto like "The Jews are no better than the Nazis". But this does *not* mean, however, that they are motivated by anti-Semitism in any case.
- The underlying motivation *can* also be of an anti-Zionist nature and aimed not at "the Jews," but rather against "Zionism," which is delegitimated as a racist and/or imperialistic/colonialist movement.
- In addition, Israel is not the only country whose policies are or have been associated with those of National Socialism. Dramatizing and scandalizing precarious human-rights situations through NS comparisons is an argumentation figure that (at the latest) since the end of the Second World War looks back on a long tradition. In post-war Germany it virtually belongs to the political culture.
- In fact, results of the ASCI Survey (Kempf 2017a) show that equating Israeli Palestinian policy with National Socialist Jewish policy can signify not only *anti-Semitic demonization* of Jews but also *anti-Zionist dramatization* of the Palestinians' human-rights situation. Those who work consistently for human rights, on the other hand, do to be sure feel a strong need for action to change Israeli policy, but nevertheless they strictly reject equating it with NS policy.
- NS comparisons find undivided support if anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism go hand in hand, as well with a small group of people whose human-rights engagement does to be sure save them from anti-Semitic attitudes, but whose marked anti-Zionism in connection with fatal black-and-white painting leaves no room for the insight that no crime in human history comes in any way close to equaling the literally industrial destruction of the European Jews by National Socialism.


As an example of delegitimation, Sharansky cites the questioning of Israel's right to exist, and offers a substantiation for this, whose own *double standards* hide themselves behind the universality of human rights: "If other peoples have the right to live safely in their homeland, then the Jewish people also have a right to live safely in their homeland."

- Whether questioning this right is really directed against "the Jews" or (only) against "Zionism" depends, however, on *who* questions it and to which kind of *pattern* the questioning is linked with other anti-Semitic and/or anti-Zionist topoi.
- Suppose, for example, that a German denies Israel's right to exist and insists it would be better if the Jews left the Middle East, and one asks him if Jews who emigrated there from Germany should be welcomed here. Should such a person reject this possibility, then the anti-Semitic prejudice is unmistakable: The Jews are not only unwanted in the Middle East, but everywhere else as well, and above all here among us.
- If to the contrary a Palestinian (or someone who identifies with Palestinians) questions Israel's right to exist, then it is a somewhat different matter. At least as long as Israel denies Palestinians the right to national self-determination, and there are even groups in Israel who advance the view that it would be best for the Palestinians to leave the country – and indeed not just Israel, but also the occupied West Bank (Baram 2016).
- That Jewish citizens of Israel have a right to live safely in their own state should thereby in no way be doubted, but Sharansky's substantiation for why rejecting this right was anti-Semitic is, for Palestinians at any rate, irrelevant as long as Israel denies them this same right.
- There can be no doubt that denying Israel's right to exist is unacceptable, already for reasons of international law, nor that it represents the probably crassest expression of hostility against Israel. Yet, whether this hostility is directed against Jews as Jews may differ from case to case.

Even hostility to Israel is not the same as anti-Israeli anti-Semitism, and it does make a difference whether someone is hostile to Israel because Israel is the Jewish state or because he makes Israel responsible for violating Palestinians' basic rights. In the same way, it also makes a difference whether one is hostile to Palestinians because they are Arabs or Muslims, or because one sees them as threatening Israel's existence.

Double standards similar to those in Sharansky's substantiation are also present in pro-Israeli hardliners' line of argument, and by referring to the 3 Ds, even the slightest deviation from their own dogmas suffices to "convict" not only pro-Palestinian hardliners but also moderate critics of Israel of anti-Semitism (Kempf 2017b, c).

In fact, more than half (62%) of the active critics of Israel are hardliners. For human-rights-based work for a just peace in Israel/Palestine, this can be seen as quite problematic. In terms of the German population, however, the predominant majority (90%) of human-rights-oriented critics of Israel position themselves in a more moderate frame (cf. Fig. 8) that decidedly supports the rights of Palestinians, but gets along without the double standards characteristic of hardliners (Kempf 2015: 210).



E = Advocacy of coercive measure against the opponent  
F = Criticism of opponent's intransigence  
G = Delegitimation of opponent's policy

H = Justification of own military measures  
I = Condemnation of opponent's use of violence

Figure 8: Polarized pro-Palestinian frame

### 3.4 Associations and implicatures

The most disastrous feature of Sharansky's 3 D Test is that it may lure people on a wrong track and make them discover anti-Semitism where there really is none.

- This has devastating consequences, only the least of which is the fourth D, *denunciation* of human-rights-based critique of Israel as anti-Semitic and the resulting slander of critics (Kempf 2017b).
- More serious is the resulting limitation of freedom of opinion and the obstruction of constructive discourse on critics' objections to Israeli policy.
- And the perhaps worst consequence is that many Jews inside and outside of Israel thereby become panic stricken by a sense of being surrounded always and everywhere only by anti-Semites, which paralyzes their ability to agree on a peace settlement with the Palestinians.

The danger that the 3 D-Test will lead to unjustified accusations of anti-Semitism is still further intensified by associations and implicatures that are obvious to radical supporters of Israeli policy.

- Thus, subjectively perceived delegitimation is only too easily associated with Sharansky's extreme example, whereby, e.g., criticism of the illegality of settlements under international law is placed on the same level with denying Israel's right to exist.
- And the implicatures of critique of Israel – e.g., what a supporter of Israel thinks he reads between the lines (Betzler & Glittenberg 2015) – or also: what can be read into them, if one attributes anti-Semitic attitudes to critics – results in seeing an anti-Semitic cliché behind almost any criticism. Especially as there is scarcely a negative character trait or misdeed that the Jews have not been accused of sometime in their long history.

How this obstructs constructive discourse on Israeli occupartheid becomes evident in what Avraham Burg (2014) calls "hysteria" at the *Boycott, Divestment & Sanctions* (BDS) movement.

Also supported by many Jews, BDS is a non-violent movement that tries to exert economic pressure on Israel to end occupartheid. It is *not per se* directed against "the Jews" or "the Israelis," but rather against injustice done to Palestinians in Israel and the occupied territories. And, as Avraham Burg explains in the Israeli daily paper

*Haaretz*,<sup>13</sup> it may be an effective means to change the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, "if the discourse changes from concepts like strength and resistance to the level of rights and values."

- The intent and purpose of BDS is to influence public opinion.
- The economic damage that BDS can do to Israel is rather marginal.
- Exerting economic pressure does, nevertheless, bear within it destabilization of Israel as an implicature (and without this implicature BDS could not exert any pressure).
- The chain of associations from destabilization via denial of Israel's right to exist to anti-Semitism is very short.
- Not least of all, this is also because an economic boycott of Israel evokes associations with the NS slogan "Do not buy from Jews."
- This association is particularly alarming for many Holocaust survivors and their descendants – but also, e.g., for non-Jewish Germans who have learned the lessons of history.

What was completely unproblematic in the struggle against South African apartheid is a hot potato in the struggle against Israeli occupartheid. Thus it becomes quite understandable if supporters of Israeli policy see an anti-Semitic movement in BDS. Not because it is one, but rather because it requires a substantial amount of critical reflection to reject this association chain.

The failure of Burg's vision that BDS could shift discourse from concepts like strength and resistance to the level of rights and values is thereby already implicit in the BDS concept itself, and it should be no surprise, if BDS finally turns out to be a shot in the foot of the human-rights based work for a just peace in Israel/Palestine.

One can react to BDS in different ways: join the movement, sympathize, shun, reject or defy it. *Each* of these attitudes is covered by the basic right to freedom of opinion and must be protected by it. Freedom of opinion must always include freedom for those who think differently.

Accordingly, there is no reason for excitement when, e.g., the Jewish Voice for a Just Peace in the Middle East (Jüdische Stimme für gerechten Frieden in Nahost) calls for a boycott of the Jewish National Fund (JNF), and the JNF thereupon puts pressure on the Bank for Social Economy (Bank für Sozialwirtschaft) to end its business ties with the Jewish Voice (Weinthal 2017). But as a human-rights activist one can learn from this incident how important it is to take a clear position beyond any doubt.

In fact, the Bank for Social Economy has resumed its business relations with the Jewish Voice, after both sides had exchanged their standpoints and the Jewish Voice had declared that it decisively rejects activities that put Israel's existence in question and only supports activities that exert nonviolent pressure for an end to Israeli occupation policy and are not aimed against the state of Israel's existence.<sup>14</sup>

Where there is such clarity, even tangible calumnies like the suspicion of anti-Semitism and closeness to terrorism raised by Benjamin Weinthal in the *Jerusalem Post* or respectively on Twitter against Jewish Voice (Weinthal 2016, 2017) are in the end ineffective. And if not, they still unmask themselves – even if they nevertheless all too often have an effect.

#### 4. Conclusion

The greatest mistake that one can make in view of successful slander is to infer from its success on the power of Jewry and to fall prey to the myth of a Jewish conspiracy.

- It is not "the Jews" or "Jewry" who try in this way to obstruct critique of Israel, but rather only a more or less large (or small) group of Jews (and also non-Jews).
- Pro-Israeli hardliners are a minority, and even if they hold leadership positions in Jewish organizations they are not representative of the Jews, Among American Jews only 8% are unconditional supporters of Netanyahu's policies (Ben-Ami 2011).
- Not least, the success of their efforts would also be unthinkable if they did not find a receptive audience among non-Jews: among decision-makers, whose prior concern sometimes may be to wear a white hat and to avoid being accused of promoting anti-Semitism.

That Natan Sharansky's invalid 3 D Test makes this all too easy for them is a tragedy, because it results in practical consequences that de facto result in limitations on freedom of opinion. And moreover, there is also reason for doubt about how reliable the support of the apparent "friends of Israel" really is:

- (German) supporters of Israeli policy are generally poorly informed about the conflict and are even less well informed than anti-Semitic critics.
- Their emotional closeness to the conflict is also still less than that of anti-Semitic critics.

<sup>13</sup> Quoted according to the German translation, which appeared on 02/17/2014 in the Austrian daily paper *Der Standard*.

<sup>14</sup> See on this the Jewish Voice's press release, documented in conflict & communication online 16(2).

- They also tend to (some) anti-Israeli resentments.
- It is precisely the radical supporters who are not free of anti-Zionist resentments either,
- and as well the secondary anti-Semitic demand to close the books on the past finds the greatest agreement among them.

In view of this, one should also not forget what the former Israeli ambassador in Germany, Shimon Stein, and the Israeli historian Moshe Zimmermann impressively pointed out: "Who cries 'anti-Semitism' where there is none harms the struggle against anti-Semitism" (Stein & Zimmermann 2017).

#### References

- Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 3, 193-209.
- Baram, N. (2016). Im Land der Verzweiflung: Ein Israeli reist in die besetzten Gebiete. München: Hanser.
- Bar-Tal, D. (1998). Societal beliefs in times of intractable conflict: The Israeli case. *The International Journal of Conflict Management* 9(1), 22-50.
- Bar-Tal, D. (2015). "Love your neighbor as yourself". Documentation of an open letter by Prof. Daniel Bar-Tal, Tel Aviv University, Israel. *conflict & communication online* 14(1)
- Ben-Ami, J. (2011). A new voice for Israel. Fighting for the survival of the Jewish nation. New York: palgrave macmillan.
- Bergmann, W. (2002). Geschichte des Anti-Semitismus. München: Beck.
- Bergmann, W. (2008). Vergleichende Meinungsforschung zum Anti-Semitismus in Europa und die Frage nach einem "neuen europäischen Anti-Semitismus". In: Rensmann, L. & Schoeps, J. H. (Hrsg.), *Judentum. Anti-Semitismus in Europa*. Berlin: Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 473-507.
- Bergmann, W. & Erb, R. (1986). Kommunikationslatenz, Moral und öffentliche Meinung. *Theoretische Überlegungen zum Anti-Semitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 38, 223-246.
- Betzler, L. & Glittenberg, M. (2015). *Anti-Semitismus im deutschen Mediendiskurs. Eine Analyse des Falls Jakob Augstein*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Boehm, O. (2015). Jüdischer Ungehorsam. Interview im Deutschlandfunk, gesendet 8.2.2015, 9:30 Uhr. [http://www.deutschlandradio.de/audio-archiv.260.de.html?drau:submit=1&drau:station\\_id=4&drau:searchterm=&drau:from=08.02.2015&drau:to=08.02.2015&drau:broadcast\\_id=&drau:page=4](http://www.deutschlandradio.de/audio-archiv.260.de.html?drau:submit=1&drau:station_id=4&drau:searchterm=&drau:from=08.02.2015&drau:to=08.02.2015&drau:broadcast_id=&drau:page=4) (Download 8.2.2015).
- Burg, A. (2010). "Wir sehen überall Nazis". Interview mit Die Wochenzeitung vom 1.7.2010. <http://www.woz.ch/artikel/rss/19495.html> (Download 3.2.2014).
- Burg, A. (2014): Was ist falsch an Boykotten und Sanktionen? *Der Standard*, 17.2.2014.
- Cotler, I. (2006). The disgrace of Durban – five years later. *National Post*, 12. September 2006, A20.
- Demirel, A., Farschid, O., Gryglewski, E., Heil, J., Longerich, P., Pfahl-Traugher, A., Salm, M., Schoeps, J. H., Wahdat-Hagh, W. & Wetzel, J. (2011). Bericht des unabhängigen Expertenkreises Anti-Semitismus. *Anti-Semitismus in Deutschland – Erscheinungsformen, Bedingungen, Präventionsansätze*. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 17/7700. <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/077/1707700.pdf> (Download 31.12.2011).
- Deutsch, M. (1973). *The resolution of conflict*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Deutsch, M. (2000). Cooperation and competition. In: Deutsch, M. & Coleman, P. T. (Eds.), *The handbook of conflict resolution. Theory and practice*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 21-40.
- Grossmann, D. (2014). Erinnern wir uns an die Zukunft. *TagesAnzeiger* vom 4.8.2014. <http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/kultur/diverses/Erinnern-wir-uns-an-die-Zukunft/story/10216028> (Download 24.11.2014).
- Heitmeyer, W. (2005). Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit. Die theoretische Konzeption und empirische Ergebnisse aus 2002, 2003 und 2004. In: *Heitmeyer, W. (Hg.), Deutsche Zustände, Folge, 3*, 13-34.
- Kempf, W. (2015). Israelkritik zwischen Anti-Semitismus und Menschenrechtsidee. Berlin: verlag irena regener.
- Kempf, W. (2017a). Über die Bedeutung von NS-Vergleichen im israelkritischen Diskurs / On the meaning of NS-comparisons in Israel-critical discourse. *conflict & communication online*, 16(1).
- Kempf, W. (2017b). Zur Kampagne gegen Friedenskräfte im israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt. *wissenschaft & frieden*, 35(3), 44-46.
- Kempf, W. (2017c). Societal Beliefs and Moral Disengagement in der Kampagne gegen Friedenskräfte im israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt – Dokumentation der empirischen Befundlage. *Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz*, Nr. 80. Berlin: regener.
- Keret, E. (2013). Die Besatzung frisst unsere Seele. Interview mit Frankfurter Rundschau vom 16.2.2013. <http://www.fr-online.de/panorama/interview-israelischer-autor-die-besatzung-frisstunsere-seele,1472782,21823400,view,asFirstTeaser.html> (Download 3.2.2014).
- Lapid, Y. (2014). Rede an der Gedenkstätte Gleis 17 am 20.08.2014.
- Sharansky, N. (2004). Anti-Semitismus in 3-D. Die Differenzierung zwischen legitimer Kritik an Israel und dem sogenannten neuen Anti-Semitismus. *haGalil.com*. Jüdisches Leben online. <http://www.hagalil.com/anti-Semitismus/europa/sharansky.htm> (Download 11.7.2017).
- Stein, S. & Zimmermann, M. (2017). Das böse Etikett. Wer über Anti-Semitismus redet, sollte genau sein – das gilt auch für die israelische Regierung. *Die Zeit* 23/2017. <http://www.zeit.de/2017/23/p-von-aue> (Download 14.7.2017)
- Weinthal, B. (2016). "German bank pulls plug on anti-Israel BDS bank account. Shutdown reasons may include terrorism and anti-Semitism. *jpost.com*, 28.11.2016. <https://twitter.com/BenWeinthal/status/803191051397664769> (Download 18.1.2017).

- Weinthal, B. (2017). German Jewish NGOs urge bank to close BDS account. Jerusalem Post vom 16. November 2016. <http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/benjamin-weinthal-german-jewish-ngos-urge-bank-to-close-bds-account1/> (Download 18.1.2017).
- Zick, A. & Küpper, B. (2010/11). Anti-Semitische Mentalitäten. Bericht über Ergebnisse des Forschungsprojekts Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit in Deutschland und Europa. Universität Bielefeld (Expertise für den unabhängigen Expertenkreis). [http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/Politik\\_Gesellschaft/Expertenkreis\\_Anti-Semmitismus/kuepper.html](http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/Politik_Gesellschaft/Expertenkreis_Anti-Semmitismus/kuepper.html) (Download 16.1.2014).

*The author:*

Wilhelm Kempf is Professor emeritus of Psychological Methodology and Peace Research at the University of Konstanz, Germany. Since 2002 he is the editor of *conflict & communication online* ([www.cco.regener-online.de](http://www.cco.regener-online.de)). His fields of research include quantitative and qualitative research methodology, nonviolent conflict resolution, peace journalism and the construction of social reality by the mass media. He currently works on a research project on "Criticizing Israel, coming to terms with German history and differentiating aspects of modern anti-Semitism".

eMail: [cco@regener-online.de](mailto:cco@regener-online.de), Website: <http://www.pfkn.regener-online.de/>